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Abstract 
Neuropsychological studies described brain damaged patients with a deficit at 
recognizing exemplars from some semantic categories while being still able to recognize 
exemplars from other categories, and vice versa. This evidence suggested that categories such 
as animals, plants, artifacts and conspecifics might be independently organized in the brain. 
Several theories tried to explain the category specificity, and proposed that concepts are 
represented in the brain according to the modality of their features, on the relevance of a 
domain for survival or on the degree of inter-correlation between features. 
Perhaps one limitation on investigation on how categories are represented in the brain 
has to do with the poor characterization of the concept about conspecifics often limited to 
famous and familiar persons as unique entities, and as such not very comparable with the 
other categories of stimuli. Recent findings suggested that even the knowledge about 
categories of conspecifics defined as social groups might well be represented independently 
of other categories.  
In the current thesis I investigated whether social group knowledge is indeed 
represented independently of other categories, consistently with previous findings, and the 
eventual neural substrates of such knowledge. In two different studies, I tested the knowledge 
of patients with brain tumors and neurodegenerative diseases about social groups, animate 
and inanimate entities. Correlating patients’ behavioural performance with structural MRI 
data, I found that the lesion of a left-lateralized set of areas was selectively associated with the 
impairment in naming social group pictures. Specifically, inferior frontal gyrus, insula and 
anterior temporal cortex were associated with social group processing in both the studies. 
Since these areas were reported to be involved in emotional processing, In a third study with 
healthy individuals, I tested whether one of the above brain regions, within the opercular part 
of inferior frontal gyrus, might be involved in processing social groups per se or in processing 
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the valence of stimuli. Results revealed that this area was involved in the processing of 
negative stimuli and suggested that the semantic impairment in processing social groups 
might be related to the intrinsic emotional value of this category of stimuli. This pattern of 
findings suggests that human conceptual knowledge is associated with modality-specific 
processing areas, and that social group representation might interacts with emotional 
features. 
 
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
When we experience the world, we come across several types of entities, varying in their 
shape, colour, taste, smell and sound. In order to cope with this complexity, and to prevent the 
need to newly process the items each time, we automatically sort them into different 
categories. Thus, when we perceive an entity with a particular configuration of features, we 
are able to identify it effortlessly as an “apple” or a “lion”, and adapt our behaviour 
consistently with item perceived. For instance, in the former case we will move toward the 
fruit - in the event we wish to eat it, while in the latter case we will run away from it. Hence, to 
cope with the complexity of the world and to immediately react with the appropriate 
behaviour we rely on this information organized in different concepts in our conceptual system 
(or semantic system). 
From an evolutionary perspective, the categorization process is likely to have played a 
critical role in human survival, allowing to rapidly escape from multiple type of hazardous 
entities - including animals and conspecifics - and conversely to recognise possible sources of 
food, as vegetables or animals, and reproduction (conspecifics). In the upcoming text I will use 
the term domain to indicate broad groups of entities, such as animate entities, inanimate 
entities or conspecifics, and the term category to indicate smaller groups of items, such as 
animals, plants, tools and conspecifics. The term animate entities will be used as a synonym of 
living entities, including both animals, plants, fruits and vegetables, while the term inanimate 
entities or non-living entities, or artifacts will reflect the category of non-living artificial 
objects (e.g. tools). 
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In my thesis I will focus on the conceptual representation of conspecifics, and 
specifically on categories of individuals sharing common features or social groups (Rumiati et 
al., 2014). The study of how social groups are represented in the brain is motivated by the fact 
that most of the literature explored conspecifics knowledge at a very specific level of 
representation (i.e., unique-entity level) and compared this knowledge with more general 
stimuli (i.e., each concept could be applied to many different exemplars) such as animals or 
artifacts. Moreover understanding how social groups are represented is particularly relevant 
for its relationship with social prejudice. 
I will begin my dissertation by describing two important phenomena – global and 
category-specific semantic impairments – which have been very instrumental in promoting 
the formulation of several theories of how concepts are represented in the semantic system. 
1.1 The emergence of semantic deficits in neurological patients 
1.1.1 Global semantic impairment 
The selective impairment of semantic memory, with spared (or relatively spared) 
visuo-perceptual abilities, executive functions, attention and episodic memory was firstly 
reported by Warrington (1975). She reported three patients with impaired recognition of 
both pictorial and verbal stimuli, particularly when tested at a subordinate level of specificity. 
Indeed these patients, if presented with pictures of flowers, were strongly impaired at 
recognizing and naming the specific flower type depicted, but not at identifying the item as a 
flower. 
Warrington (1975) ascribed the deficit reported at the level of the semantic memory 
thus providing support to the distinction made by Tulving (1972) between semantic and 
episodic memory. The patients suffered from a form of degenerative disease, affecting 
primarily the semantic system, has been observed often afterwards (e.g., Hodges et al., 2007) 
and named semantic dementia (SD). More recently SD has been classified among the fronto-
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temporal lobar degenerations, together with the behavioural variant of fronto-temporal 
dementia (bvFTD) and primary non-fluent progressive aphasia (PNFA) (see Neary et al., 
1998). The pattern of brain atrophy is remarkably different among patients affected by these 
syndromes, with the bvFTD prominently affected at the level of frontal lobes (Frisoni et al., 
1996), PNFA at peri-sylvian level (including both frontal and temporal lobes) (Nestor et al., 
2003) and SD at the level of anterior temporal lobes (ATLs) (Mummery et al., 2000).  
A distinction between left and right anterior temporal variants within the semantic 
dementia syndrome has been proposed. Indeed, some patients with a pattern of atrophy more 
located within the left ATL tend to be impaired more at naming tasks, with a better 
recognition performance; conversely, patients with a more atrophic right ATL than left ATL 
tend to be impaired at both naming and comprehension tasks (Lambon Ralph et al., 2001). 
Moreover, SD patients with more pronounced right temporal atrophy tend also to be impaired 
in face perception, to show delusions and to get lost (Chan et al., 2009).  
1.1.2 The category-specificity effect 
The term category-specificity effect indicates a condition, now described in many 
patients, characterized by the selective loss of semantic information for one or more 
categories of concepts. The deficit was first observed in a patient with a selective deficit in 
recognizing inanimate entities presented visually or by touch, and food (except by taste), than 
for animate entities (Neilsen, 1946). The opposite pattern was also reported, and referred to a 
patient with a deficit at recognizing living entities than inanimate entities but, unfortunately, 
the clinical description was not associated with quantitative measures (Neilsen, 1946). Years 
after, Warrington and Shallice (1984) first piece documented in a quantitative manner the 
presence of categorical semantic impairments in patients affected by herpes simplex virus 
encephalitis (HSVE), a rare brain disease affecting, especially at the beginning of the onset, the 
anterior-inferior temporal lobes (Gitelmann et al., 2001; Noppeney et al., 2007). Two of the 
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patients reported (J.B.R. and S.B.Y.) were tested on their knowledge about different categories 
of entities (e.g., animate entities, foods and inanimate entities) using different modality of 
presentation (e.g., visual, auditory) and types of stimuli (e.g. line drawings, coloured pictures, 
words). Results showed that both patients had a selective loss of knowledge about living 
entities (animals and plants) and foods. It is worth noting for the theoretical implications 
which will be discussed in the following sections, the case of  patient J.B.R, who not only failed 
at recognizing animals (insects, fish), plants (flowers, trees, fruits and vegetables) and foods 
(drinks) but also with inanimate categories such as precious stones and musical instruments.  
The opposite pattern - that is impaired recognition of inanimate entities and spared 
recognition of animate entities - has been shown in two patients V.E.R. and Y.OT (Warrington 
and McCarthy, 1983; 1987). These two patients, after a vascular damage, became globally 
aphasic and showed impairments at recognizing inanimate entities than animate entities in a 
word-to-picture matching task.  
Before discussing the different theoretical accounts of categorical effects I would like to 
mention that some neuropsychologists questioned that these deficits were true. First, it has 
been argued that these deficits arose from the lack of control on stimulus factors, such as 
frequency, familiarity or visual complexity, that are known to have an impact on patients’ 
performance (Funnel and Sheridan, 1992; Gaffan and Heywood, 1993; Stewart, Parkin and 
Hunkin, 1992). For instance, Stewart et al. (1992) reported a patient H.O. with herpes simplex 
encephalitis who showed a categorical semantic impairment for the animate entities on 
picture naming task (accuracy: animate entities 65%, inanimate entities 86%). After the 
stimuli were matched for familiarity, frequency and visual complexity, the categorical effect 
disappeared (accuracy: animate entities 42%, inanimate entities 36%). These results suggest 
that these variables need to be controlled when selecting the stimuli used in 
neuropsychological studies to avoid that the categorical semantic deficits observed reflect 
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differences in the relevant variables described above. However, categorical semantic deficits 
were observed very often after controlling stimuli for the relevant variables (see Capitani et 
al., 2003, for a review), suggesting that the categorical effects can be reliable.  
Secondly, categorical semantic deficits have been suggested to reflect the pre-morbid 
knowledge about each category. More specifically, in a study on healthy participants 
Barbarotto et al. (2002) reported that males tended to have a better knowledge for artifacts, 
while females tended to know biological categories better. However, even after controlling for 
gender-specific familiarity, the categorical semantic deficits were still reported (Albanese et 
al., 2000; Samson and Pillon, 2003).  
Further investigations showed the existence of finer-grained categorical deficits of 
patients, with selective impairment in the knowledge of plants (Hart et al., 1985; Farah and 
Wallace, 1992), animals (Hart and Gordon, 1992) and person-specific items (Lucchelli and De 
Renzi, 1992; McKenna and Warrington, 1980).  
1.1.3 Category-specificity effect: neural substrates  
The double dissociations between animate and inanimate entities knowledge in brain 
damaged patients, somewhat implies that two subsystems have discrete neural substrates. A 
critical review of single-case studies showing category-specific semantic impairments in 
patients (Gainotti et al., 2000) reported a bilateral anterior-mesial temporal damage 
associated with animate-entities knowledge deficit, and damage within the left dorso-lateral 
convexity associated with deficits affecting man-made artifacts. Moreover, Brambati et al. 
(2006) tested a big sample of patients (N=152) with different neurodegenerative diseases on 
a naming task including animate and inanimate entities as stimuli and correlated grey matter 
thickness volumes with naming performance using VBM. They found that the animate entities 
naming performance positively correlated with the right anterior-mesial temporal cortex, 
while performance on inanimate entities positively correlated with the left posterior middle 
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temporal gyrus. These patterns of association between right ATL and left superior temporal 
gyrus/inferior parietal lobe corresponding to, respectively, living and non-living entities have 
been confirmed using other techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
(e.g., Anzellotti et al., 2011; Damasio et al., 1996; Devlin et al., 2002) and 
electroencephalography (EEG) (Chan et al., 2011). 
1.2 Theoretical accounts of the semantic organization 
Many theories have been proposed to explain how category-specific semantic deficits 
arise in patients and, importantly, these observations have been used to account for how the 
semantic system is organized in the brain. Here I will review three main groups of theories 
according to which concepts are represented in the brain depending on the modality of their 
features, on the relevance of a domain for survival or on the degree of inter-correlation 
between features.  
1.2.1 Categories: the domain-specific hypothesis 
According to the domain-specific hypothesis (DSH) (Caramazza and Shelton, 1998) 
evolution has shaped our semantic system into different, independent domains. According to 
the authors, to efficiently discriminate among animals (that might represent predators or 
sources of food), plants (representing source of food and medicine), conspecifics (as 
competitors or source of protection and reproduction) and artifacts is critical for human 
survival. A key aspect in the DSH is that innate constrains, evolved in human brain evolution, 
influence the acquisition of different members of each category of entities, and hence their 
recognition and categorization. This aspect was corroborated, according to the Caramazza 
and Shelton (1998), by developmental studies reporting that infants were able to distinguish 
animate-inanimate entities and their relevant features (Bertenthal, 1993; Bertenthal et al., 
1984; Mandler, 1992; Baillargeon, 1993, Spelke, 1988; Spelke et al., 1995).  
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The distributed DSH (Mahon and Caramazza, 2009) is an updated version of the 
original theory emphasizing how categorical, sensory, motor and emotional properties shape 
conceptual knowledge organization. Moreover, categorical domains influence both conceptual 
representations and perception. According to their view, the functional connectivity between 
different regions of the brain shapes their domain-specific properties. Hence, the domain-
specificity of a certain region is related to its connection with other brain areas, and to the 
types of computation they perform. The emergence of these domain-specific networks, in 
Mahon and Caramazza’s view, has been induced by human evolution. One example might be 
that the need of integration of emotional and biological motion processing is higher for 
animals and conspecifics than tools and plants. And so the specialized function of fusiform 
face area (FFA) in visual processing arise from its pattern of connections, including amygdala, 
superior temporal sulcus (STS) and many other areas which are important in representing 
social relevant information (Mahon and Caramazza, 2011). 
Both the versions of the DSH predict that patients’ selective semantic impairment 
could affect not only the categories of animals, plants, conspecifics and artifacts, and not finer-
grained deficits as for land animals or kitchen utensils, while only the distributed DSH also 
predicts that, within domain-specific semantic impairments, some modality-specific features 
might be spared and other impaired as in the case of patients with prosopagnosia and 
completely spared knowledge about conspecifics (Mahon and Caramazza, 2011) 
1.2.2 Modality: the sensory/functional theory 
In order to explain the categorical specific semantic impairments, Warrington, 
McCarthy and Shallice (Warrington and McCarthy, 1983; Warrington and Shallice, 1984) 
proposed the existence of distinct semantic subsystems, processing different types of 
attributes. On the one hand, a (visual) sensory semantic system involved in processing visual 
features and, on the other, a functional semantic system involved in processing functional 
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features. The modality of the “core” attribute, which is the minimal information necessary to 
recognize a concept, is held to be different between animate and inanimate entity knowledge. 
Hence, animate entity knowledge tends to rely on sensory attributes, while 
inanimate/artifactual entity knowledge tends to rely on functional attributes. The SFT does 
not exclude that both animate and inanimate entities might be described also by, respectively, 
functional and sensory features, but according to the SFT, the key factor in defining each 
category of knowledge is the modality of their “core” attributes. Following this theory, damage 
to the perceptual semantic subsystem would selectively impair patients’ recognition of 
animate entities due to a degradation of the perceptual feature knowledge. Conversely, the 
selective deficit in recognizing inanimate entities would be caused by damage to the 
functional semantic subsystem, as a consequence of a degradation of the functional feature 
knowledge. This theory was corroborated by the observation that the patient J.B.R. was 
impaired not only in processing many different animate entities, including animals, plants and 
foods, but also inanimate entities such as musical instruments, metals and precious stones, 
implying that both musical instruments and precious stones “core” attributes might be 
sensory.  
The basic tenets of the SFT have been tested and confirmed in a computational study 
(Farah and McClelland, 1991). In their model, the authors included different sets of units, 
corresponding to verbal inputs (or outputs), visual inputs (or outputs) and a semantic system 
(divided into two parts - sensory and functional semantic systems – as assumed by the SFT). 
The four sets of units were bi-directionally connected to each other, excluding the connection 
between visual and verbal inputs. The model was trained by presenting living and non-living 
items (which had been previously assessed for their sensory and functional features) and 
then damaged on either the sensory and functional semantic systems. Results showed that 
lesions of the visual semantic system led to a lower performance on the living entities, while 
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damaging the functional semantic system led to a poorer performance on non-living entities, 
as predicted by the SFT.  
In line with these predictions a number of studies investigated feature knowledge in 
patients showing category-specificity effect. Silveri and Gainotti (1988) reported a patient, 
L.A., with selective deficit in animate entities and food knowledge. The effect was consistent 
across repetitions of the stimuli and was equally present with both visual and verbal 
descriptive stimuli. Importantly, the patient was more impaired in recognizing animals from 
visual than functional descriptions. However, other studies (see Capitani et al. 2003 for a 
review), as the one by Borgo and Shallice (2003) found that in patients with the very same 
deficit as that shown by patient L.A. (Silveri and Gainotti, 1988), the feature knowledge was 
equally impaired for both functional and sensory features. In contrast to the prediction of the 
SFT and Farah and McClelland model, the investigation of feature knowledge in patients with 
categorical semantic deficits is not conclusive. 
One of the most relevant arguments that has been moved against the SFT is the 
existence of patients with selective sub-categorical semantic impairment, as that for plants or 
animals. Indeed, since both animal and plant knowledge should rely on sensory features, 
damage to the sensorial subsystem should not affect neither animal nor plant knowledge. 
Three accounts have been proposed to clarify this point. First, according to the multiple 
processing channels account (MPCA) (Warrington and McCarthy, 1987; Crutch and 
Warrington, 2003), which might be considered a refinement of the SFT, within the sensory 
and functional distinction, different contributions from sub-sensory (e.g. visual, auditory, 
tactile) and sub-functional (e.g. kinematics, proprioception) modalities, might define each 
sub-category (i.e., fruit representation might rely on both visual (shape, colour) and gustatory 
featural knowledge). Hence, the impairment in fruit knowledge might arise from the selective 
lesion of the sub-modal semantic systems representing shape, colour and taste. Second, 
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according to Sartori and colleagues (2007), pre-morbid individual differences in the degree of 
knowledge of each sub-category of concepts might be the cause of these phenomenon, leading 
patients with a poorer pre-morbid knowledge of plants, more prone to plant knowledge 
impairment following brain damage. Third explains the plant-animal double dissociations 
suggesting that the two categories represent two distinct domains of knowledge as suggested 
by the Domain specific Hypothesis (Caramazza and Shelton, 1998) that we will discuss in the 
next section. 
1.2.2.1 Convergence zone theory 
Damasio (1989) proposed that, when we perceive an entity, our modality-specific 
cortical areas activate and process its basic features (e.g., sensory or motor feature); in this 
respect, the specific pattern of activation represents the modality-specific experience of such 
entity. These modality-specific areas are connected to associative areas (Convergence zones) 
(CZ) that are involved in the storage of modality-specific states. According to the author, CZs 
are present at multiple levels of processing, leading to a hierarchical processing of each 
stimulus. High-order associative areas (which are placed within anterior frontal and temporal 
cortices) store the multi-modal information relative to each concept, while uni-modal 
associative areas encode specific patterns of modality-specific experiences. This does not 
mean that information is stored into different formats; rather, neurons (or sets of neurons) 
within a certain CZ encode the neural pathway necessary to activate other lower-level CZs, 
and hence modality-specific representations. According to the CZ theory perceiving some 
features of a given object (e.g. sound) will activate a convergent zone, triggering the activation 
of specific pattern of sensory cortices, representing other specific feature of the object. For 
example, hearing the bark of a dog will activate a population of neuron within a CZ, triggering 
the activation of visual and tactile features of the concept “dog” in somatosensory and visual 
cortices.  
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The domain representation, and hence categorical semantic deficits, will emerge as a 
consequence of reality constrains, such as feature similarity, spatial and temporal sequence 
and temporal placement of a given entity or group of entities, and neurobiological reasons, as 
the presence of neurons recording the temporal coincidence and the inter-relationship 
between different entities within the same categories. 
1.2.2.2 Conceptual topography theory 
After the formulation of Damasio’s CZ theory (1989), other authors (Simmons and 
Barsalou, 2003) further developed Damasio’s basic assumption, proposing the conceptual 
topography theory (CTT) that basically consists in adding two basic principles guiding 
semantic and perceptual representation in the brain: the similarity-in-topography principle 
(STP) and the variable dispersion principle (VDP). Their aim was to reconcile apparently 
mutually exclusive theories as the SFT and the conceptual structure account (CSA) (Tyler and 
Moss, 2001).  
According to the STP, in associative areas (CZs) the topographical distance between 
two neurons is negatively correlated to the similarity of the features they are conjoining. In 
other words, the neurons conjoining very similar features will be very close topographically, 
while for less similar feature they will more dispersed. For example, when perceiving 
different faces of humans and monkeys, the activations of different neurons within an 
associative area will be very close to each other respectively for human faces and for monkey 
faces, while there will be a certain topographical distance between human and monkey faces. 
This should not be confused with the presence of categorical representation within each 
associative area (members of the same category tend to share many features), since it does 
not imply the absence of conjoining neurons for different categories of entities. Indeed, as the 
VDP claims, as members of the same category decrease in their similarity, conjoined neurons 
will tend to be more dispersed in associative areas topography. 
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Aside from these two principles, Simmons and Barsalou (2003) further differentiated 
distinct modules within each CZ. When we perceive and object, distinct sensory early-
processing areas activate, irrespective of attention allocation, leading to modality-specific 
states, necessary for experiencing the basic features of that object (as also claimed by 
Damasio, 1989). For instance, feature maps will encode colour, line orientation, pitch and 
tactile sensations of a specific object. Neurons representing such features will be connected to 
two different module of a given modality-specific CZ: the analytic CZ and the holistic CZ. The 
function of these two modules is guided by attention, and is necessary for encoding 
conceptual properties of a given object, but while the first processes high frequency 
properties (i.e., colour, line direction for the visual modality), the second processes more 
global properties (i.e., shape and location for the visual modality). Both analytic and holistic 
CZs are connected to the modality CZ. This area extracts statistical regularities across the 
activity of analytic and holistic CZs in order to form modality-specific categorical 
representations. Modality-specific CZs are also connected to cross-modal CZs, which are 
responsible for cross-modal representation of categories of knowledge.  
In Simmons and Barsalou’s view, category specificity effect will arise from lesion of 
distinct units in the model, depending of the importance of feature representation for each 
category of entities. Single category semantic impairment might arise from both modality (in 
case one modality of representation is crucial for the knowledge of the category) and cross-
modal CZs, while generalized semantic impairment should be observed only when the 
damage is localizes to cross-modal CZs. 
1.2.3 Featural correlation 
Several connectionist models have been developed in order to explain how semantic 
knowledge is represented in the brain, building on the categorical semantic deficits in 
patients. The common feature of these models is that categories emerge from patterns of 
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featural similarity between semantic concepts. Two concepts of the same category tend to 
share more semantic features than those included in different categories (i.e., a cat and a cow 
both have four legs, eyes, and fur). One basic assumption common to these models is that 
distinct categories do not have discrete neural underpinnings. Accordingly, following brain 
damage, patients’ categorical deficits tend to emerge as the degradation of certain semantic 
features, shared by many members of the same category. In this context, a very specific model 
that aims at explaining category-specific semantic impairments is the conceptual structure 
account (CSA) (Tyler and Moss, 2001; Tyler et al., 2004). 
1.2.3.1 The conceptual structure account 
Differently from other accounts, the CSA proposed that the patterns of specific 
semantic impairments could arise from differences in the internal structure of different 
categories of knowledge. In this account the feature structure defines high-level conceptual 
organization. Specifically, members of the animate entities, as dogs and lions, are defined by 
many inter-correlated, shared features (i.e. have four legs, eyes and fur) and also by a few 
distinctive features (specific for each concept), which are scarcely correlated with the other 
features. Conversely, artifacts tend to be represented with more distinctive and less shared 
features. Shared features in artifact knowledge are less correlated with other features. Shared 
features are important in order to accurately recognize the category of each entity, while 
distinctive properties are necessary to identify each distinct exemplar. Since the most 
represented features are the most resilient to damage, after brain lesion of the semantic 
processing areas, distinct patterns of impairments will emerge across categories/domains. 
Distinctive features of each concept, being less correlated with the other properties of the 
same concept, will be more vulnerable to damage for animate entities than shared features, 
leading to a deficit in distinguishing member of this category but recognizing their 
membership. Conversely, since there is a tight correlation between form and function in 
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artifacts and shared properties are less correlated, shared and distinctive features will not 
dissociate for the artifacts category. According to Tyler and Moss (2001), distinct tasks will 
induce the findings of different patterns of dissociations, depending on the differential 
demand on distinct and shared features. Their prediction also explains some finer-grained 
dissociation, as the selective impairment for fruit and vegetables. Indeed, this particular 
category of items has fewer inter-correlated shared features than other entities in the animate 
domain (e.g., animals), leading to their particular vulnerability to damage. However this does 
not explain the dissociation reported by Caramazza and Shelton (1998), of a patient with a 
selective loss of knowledge about animals and spared knowledge for plants and artifacts. 
1.3 Representing conspecifics 
The ability to perceive and semantically represent other people is fundamental for 
human survival and is the basis for social cognition. Indeed, our ability to function in large 
groups is possible thanks to our ability to correctly perceive, store and retrieve information 
related to our conspecifics. Although the existence of a distinct cognitive domain involved in 
social processing is still a matter of debate, some evidence seems to suggest that many 
different brain areas could be specialized in processing conspecifics.  
1.3.1 Perceiving other humans 
The perception of other humans involves, as for other categories of concepts, distinct 
modality: visual (faces and body parts) and auditory (voices) stimuli. The evidence of a 
dedicated network in perceiving other humans, as well as the theoretical models developed to 
explain experimental findings will be reviewed in the following sections. 
1.3.1.1 Face perception 
Apperceptive prosopagnosia is a selective deficit at recognizing faces (Young & Ellis, 
1989). Patients with this deficit tend to correctly perceive all the different details of a facial 
stimulus, but fail to integrate them in a unitary representation (Ramon et al., 2010; Van Belle 
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et al., 2010). Thus they are impaired at forming the representation of faces from visual inputs 
following lesions in occipito-temporal areas (see Davies-Thompson, et al., 2014, for a recent 
review). On the other hand, patients with associative prosopagnosia, typically associated with 
lesions of the right anterior temporal lobe (ATL), after having formed a face representation 
successfully, may fail to associate an identity to a face structure (e.g., De Renzi, 1986; Farah et 
al., 1995). Within the occipital and temporal lobes, three regions have been consistently 
associated to face perception in functional neuroimaging: occipital face area (OFA), the lateral 
part of the fusiform gyrus (fusiform face area, FFA) and posterior aspects of the superior 
temporal sulcus (pSTS) (Haxby et al., 2000). While FFA has been shown to process the 
invariant aspects of each face, allowing to distinguish different faces (i.e. identity) (Hoffmann 
et al., 2000; George et al., 1999; Sergent et al., 1992), pSTS has been associated to the 
processing of changeable aspects of facial stimuli, as expression and mouth movement 
(Hoffmann et al., 2000; Puce et al., 1998). OFA is thought to selectively process details of facial 
stimuli, as mouth, eyes or nose (Pitcher et al., 2011), and, might have functional connections 
with FFA and pSTS, constituting their input of information (Haxby et al., 2000).  
1.3.1.2 Voice perception 
The selective deficit at recognizing human voices (phonagnosia) has been reported in a 
few case reports (Peretz et al., 1994; Van Lancker et al., 1988). Patients’ lesions were 
distributed bilaterally within frontal, temporal and occipital lobes, and hence they were 
insufficient, in order to localize brain areas associated to this deficit. In addition, group studies 
(Lang et al., 2009; Van Lancker and Canter, 1982; Van Lancker et al., 1989), reporting deficits 
in recognizing voices for right or bilateral brain damaged patients, were not conclusive in 
identifying the brain areas that might be involved in voice processing. Conversely, functional 
neuroimaging studies suggested that activations in the middle and anterior portions of the 
superior temporal gyrus (STG) and STS (mainly in the right hemisphere) could to be involved 
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in voice-identity recognition (Andics et al., 2010; Belin and Zatorre, 2003; von Kriegstein et 
al., 2003; von Kriegstein and Giraud, 2004), while the posterior part of STG and STS is thought 
to process acoustic properties of voices (von Kriegstein and Giraud, 2004; von Kriegstein et 
al., 2007). 
1.3.2 Conceptual knowledge about conspecifics 
The semantic knowledge about conspecifics, as for the other categories of knowledge, 
might be retrieved at different levels of specificity, ranging from general (i.e., humans) to 
unique entities (i.e., person-specific knowledge). General concepts might be applied to many 
different individuals (i.e., categories of individuals or social groups), while very specific 
concepts (i.e., unique entities) only describe one single individual. Thus far, conceptual 
knowledge about conspecifics has been widely investigated at the unique-entity level of 
specificity. Indeed the stimuli most frequently used in testing both patients and healthy 
participants were pictures or written names of familiar and famous persons (Blank et al., 
2014), as we will discuss in the next section. 
1.3.2.1 Person-specific knowledge 
The impairment in recognition of other individuals is surprisingly common in 
neurosurgical and neurological population. A study investigating person-specific knowledge 
through different modalities (pictures, voices, names) (Neuner and Schweinberger, 2000), in a 
sample of patients (N = 37) with many different types of brain damage, recruited in a 
neuropsychological rehabilitation unit, found that the 58% were impaired in person-specific 
knowledge, and moreover, 28% were selectively impaired in this particular type of 
knowledge.  
Evidence obtained with different methods including neuropsychological and functional 
neuroimaging studies seems to suggest that person-specific knowledge might be represented 
independently of other categories of knowledge. A first piece of evidence is provided by a 
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double dissociation between patients with herpes simplex encephalitis, neurodegenerative 
diseases and traumatic brain injury with a person-specific knowledge deficit (i.e., loss of 
biographical information about famous people) but spared knowledge about other categories 
(Hanley et al., 1989; Evans et al., 1995, Miceli et al., 2000), and patients with the opposite and 
less frequent pattern, that is spared knowledge about conspecifics but a loss of knowledge 
about other categories such as animals, vegetables, and tools (Kay and Hanley, 2002; Lyons et 
al., 2006; Thompson et al., 2004). The loss of person-specific knowledge has been associated 
with lesion of the ATL (Gainotti, 2015) and, in particular, lesions of the right ATL seems to be 
associated with problems in person-specific knowledge retrieval from visual and auditory 
modalities, while lesions of the left ATL seem to lead to impaired production or recognition of 
verbal person-specific items. Imaging studies showed also an involvement of both ATL in 
person-specific processing, when contrasting person vs. non-person (tools or buildings) 
stimuli, in addition to the involvement of posterior cingulate (PCC), inferior frontal gyrus 
(IFG) and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) (Gorno-Tempini and Price, 2001; Simmons et al., 
2009). 
Overall, this neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence seems to suggest that 
person-specific knowledge and knowledge about living and non-living things might be 
supported, at least in part, by different neuro-mechanisms. Importantly, some authors (Tyler 
et al., 2004; Rogers et al., 2006) claimed that, since person-specific knowledge has a higher 
degree of specificity (i.e., describes only one individual) than the stimuli used for testing 
animate and inanimate knowledge (i.e., describing categories of entities), this double 
dissociations might simply reflect a different level of specificity if the stimuli (i.e., subordinate 
vs. basic level stimuli). A study that considered a less specific form of person knowledge, as 
the social group knowledge would be useful in disambiguating this issue. 
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1.3.2.2 Models of conspecific representation 
Several models have been developed to explain the emergence of specific deficits in 
face perception (and more recently in voice perception) and in person-specific knowledge. 
One of the first models was proposed by Bruce and Young (1986) and later revised by Burton 
et al. (1990, 1999). They proposed that face perception and person-specific knowledge were 
represented independently, in parallel, of other forms of knowledge. According to their model, 
a set of processing units were specialized in recognizing human features in distinct 
modalities, as faces (face recognition units, FRUs), voices (voice recognition units, VRUs) and 
names (name recognition units, NRUs). Each of these perceptual units encodes information 
specific for a single individual, which are invariant. All perceptual units converged to person 
identity nodes (PINs), storing amodal semantic representations of each person. Then each 
PIN, corresponding to a specific person, is connected to semantic information units (SIUs), 
important in order to recollect biographical knowledge of each individual, and to lexical 
output units, which are relevant for associating a face and a voice to the corresponding name 
of the person. This model assumes that modality-specific processing areas are encapsulated, 
hence converging only at the level of PINs and not allowing any possible link between 
perceptual processing areas. This model has been revised based on more detailed 
neuroanatomical studies on brain-damaged patients and experiments on healthy individuals 
with functional imaging, by associating each unit to specific brain areas (Belin et al., 2004; 
Gainotti, 2007; Gainotti et al., 2010; Gainotti and Marra, 2011; Hailstone et al., 2011; Haxby et 
al., 2000, Blank et al., 2014). Thus facial identity is recognized at the level of FFA (FRUs), while 
voice identity is recognized at the level of STS and STG (VRUs). Both FFA and STS (and STG) 
should be connected to the ATL in which the identity of each individual (PINs) is represented. 
Moreover, recently, ATL has also been linked to inappropriate social behaviours (Thompson 
et al., 2003; Chan et al., 2009), and to social concepts impairment (Zahn et al., 2009). Based on 
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this evidence, some authors suggested that the ATL may play a critical role in representing 
social knowledge (social knowledge hypothesis of ATL, Skipper, Ross & Olson, 2011; Olson et 
al., 2012). However other authors proposed a different view on the role of ATL. Indeed, based 
on the evidence of patients with semantic dementia, in which ATL atrophy is typically 
associated with a multi-modal semantic impairment, it has been proposed that ATL might 
represent a semantic ‘hub’, integrating inputs from modality-specific areas (the hub-and-
spoke theory, Rogers et al., 2004; Patterson et al., 2007) and thus representing multi-modal 
concepts. Conversely, it is worth noting that semantic dementia patients tend to be impaired, 
even at the early stages of the disease, in the knowledge of specific-concepts (e.g., dog, cat), 
with a preserved knowledge of more general concepts (e.g., mammal, animal) (Patterson et 
al., 2007). Therefore ATL might be involved in processing specific entities (e.g., unique 
entities) (Tyler et al., 2004; Rogers et al., 2006; Martin 2007). However, both fMRI and TMS 
studies revealed that ATL is involved in both subordinate and basic-level semantic processing 
(Pobric et al., 2007; Visser and Lambon-Ralph, 2011) 
These models on the role of ATL did not make any clear distinction between distinctive 
roles of left and right ATL.  Since it has been shown that distinct patterns of performance 
between patients with right or left temporal lobe lesions in recognizing and naming persons 
might arise, some authors suggested distinct roles of processing in the two hemispheres, at 
the level of ATL. Indeed patients with semantic dementia tend to show different types of 
impairment depending on the predominant laterality of the atrophy, with patients with more 
pronounced left atrophy showing disproportionate production impairment compared to 
comprehension, and patients with a more pronounced right atrophy showing a similar 
impairment in production and comprehension (Lambon Ralph et al., 2001). Patients with 
unilateral left brain damage have been reported with impaired performance on tasks 
involving verbal production as in picture naming, but spared recognition abilities (Lambon 
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Ralph et al., 2010; Lambon Ralph, et al., 2012; Drane et al., 2013). The explanation of these 
findings is still a matter of debate. In fact, according to Thompson et al. (2004), person 
knowledge is cross-modal and likely to be represented as a category within the right ATL, 
while general semantic processing may rely on left ATL. However, in Snowden et al.’s view 
(2004; 2012), person knowledge, as general semantic knowledge, is expected to be 
represented in modality-specific areas, with the right ATL being important for visual 
processing, and the left ATL for verbal processing. Conversely, Lambon Ralph et al. (2001) 
proposed a model in which semantic knowledge is stored in bilateral areas and includes 
partially redundant information. Damage to the left semantic storage, which provides the 
main inputs to a left-sided phonological area, will impair verbal production, while damage to 
the right ATL will not lead to any impairment, since semantic information is redundant in the 
two hemispheres. The critical aspect is that, according to Thompson’s theory (2004) 
conspecifics might be represented as category, converging on DSH (Caramazza and Shelton, 
1998; Caramazza and Mahon, 2009), while in Snowden’s (Snowden et al., 2004, 2012) and 
Lambon Ralph’s (Lambon Ralph et al., 2001) view conspecifics knowledge is not independent 
of the other semantic domains.  
1.3.2.3 Social group knowledge 
What we know about other individuals includes not only their physical appearance, 
their psychological or internal states and their biographical information, but also the social 
group they belong to (i.e., categories of persons, sharing category-specific features, Rumiati et 
al., 2014). Thus when we meet an individual we automatically realize that, for example, she is 
a woman, she is Chinese and she is a lawyer. Thanks to this categorization, as for non-social 
items, we can readily access to a pre-existing knowledge about these social groups (i.e., 
stereotypes), predict this person’s behaviour and consequently modify our actions 
accordingly (Gilmour, 2015).  
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The knowledge about social groups has been investigated only in a few studies to date. 
In a neuropsychological study, Rumiati et al. (2014) tested patients with primary dementias 
on the knowledge about three semantic categories (i.e., animate entities, inanimate entities 
and social groups) on word sorting tasks. They reported double dissociations in participants’ 
performance on the three categories, providing a first piece of evidence that social groups 
might be represented independently of the other categories of knowledge. Moreover, a study 
using functional imaging on healthy subjects tested knowledge about social groups and non-
social knowledge (i.e., artifacts, animals) (Contreras et al., 2011). These authors found 
different sites of activations when contrasting the social vs. non-social knowledge: specifically 
the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), posterior cingulate (PCC) and bilateral TPJ. From a 
slightly different perspective, the featural representation of social groups has also been 
investigated (Mitchell et al., 2002; Zahn et al., 2007; 2009). In their experiments, instead of 
using social groups as stimuli, the authors focused on the representation of psychological and 
internal human attributes (e.g., anxious, envy) and contrasted this knowledge to animal 
function attributes. While both patients (Zahn et al., 2009) and healthy participants (Mitchell 
et al., 2002; Zahn et al., 2007) studies highlighted the role of ATL in processing social 
concepts, only the imaging studies with healthy participants found the activation of dorso-
medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) and left temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) (Mitchell et al., 
2002; Zahn et al., 2007), regions that were found to be activated also in the study by 
Contreras et al. (2011) on social group knowledge. 
 Taken together, even though these results seem to suggest that social group 
knowledge might be represented independently of the other categories of knowledge, 
however, it is still unclear which are the brain areas that when lesioned may give rise to a 
deficit in processing social groups, as the study by Rumiati et al. (2014) lacks of neural 
anatomical correlates.  
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1.4 A meta-analysis on conspecifics representation 
In order to investigate the neural correlates of conspecifics neural representation I performed 
a meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging studies in which human stimuli at different level 
of specificity (famous faces, unfamiliar faces and voices, social concepts and social groups) 
were included. The aim of the meta-analysis is to highlight the areas that might be associated 
to the processing of conspecifics, irrespective of modality and level of specificity. 
1.4.1 Methods 
I performed a systematic review of the literature of the functional neuroimaging studies in 
which knowledge about humans was investigated using fMRI and positron emission 
tomography (PET) on healthy individuals. I included only the studies that directly compared 
human vs. non-human stimuli (i.e., animals, tools, buildings, scenes), irrespective of modality 
(e.g., visual, auditory) or stimulus type (e.g., pictures, words, vignettes, vocal and non-vocal 
stimuli), in order to capture category selective activations, while I discarded the results 
associated with general semantic processing. Specifically, in PubMed 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed) I typed: ((“social groups” OR “conspecifics” OR 
“social concepts” OR “social knowledge” OR  “person knowledge” OR “person-specific 
knowledge” OR “social semantic” OR “stereotype” OR “unique entities”) AND (“neuroimaging” 
OR “fMRI” OR “functional magnetic resonance” OR “PET” OR “positron emission 
tomography”)). I first found a total of 289 studies and, after the selection, I ended up with 12 
studies; to this sample I added papers chosen from the relevant literature on this topic, thus 
reaching as sample of 30 papers and 36 relevant contrasts (total of 290 foci) (see Table 1).  
1.4.2 Statistical analysis 
Activation-likelihood-estimation was performed using GINGER-ALE software (version 2.3.6) 
(Eickhoff et al., 2009; https://www.brainmap.org). Statistical significance was assessed using 
a cluster-level analysis (corrected through family wise error with p < .05), setting 1000 
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permutation and using as input uncorrected (p = .01) results. The analysis was performed 
using the Turkelthaub non-additive method (Turkelthaub et al., 2012) and subject-based 
smoothing (Eickhoff et al., 2009). 
Table1 
Authors Date Title Contrast Familiarity 
Stimulus 
type 
Beauchamp et 
al. 
2003 fMRI responses to video and point light 
displays of moving humans 
humans > tools unfamiliar dots 
Belin et al. 2000 Voice-selective areas in human auditory 
cortex 
humans > tools, 
animals, places 
unfamiliar voices 
Bobes et al. 2013 Timing and tuning for familiarity of 
cortical responses to faces 
humans > places unfamiliar faces 
Chiao et al. 2009 Neural representations of social status 
hierarchy in human inferior parietal 
cortex 
humans > cars familiar faces 
Contreras et al. 2011 Dissociable neural correlates of 
stereotypes and other forms of semantic 
knowledge 
humans > objects unfamiliar words 
  humans > fruit, 
clothing 
unfamiliar words 
Contreras-
Rodrıguez et 
al. 
2014 Disrupted neural processing of 
emotional faces in psychopathy 
humans > shapes unfamiliar faces 
Damasio et al. 1996 A neural basis for lexical retrieval humans > animals, 
tools 
familiar faces 
Fairhall and 
Caramazza 
2013 Category-selective neural substrates for 
person- and place-related concepts 
humans > places familiar words 
Fairhall et al. 2014 Person- and place-selective neural 
substrates for entity-specific semantic 
access 
humans > places familiar, 
unfamiliar 
faces 
  humans > places familiar faces 
  humans > places familiar words 
Filippi et al. 2010 The brain functional networks 
associated to human and animal 
suffering differ among omnivores, 
vegetarians and vegans 
humans > animals unfamiliar faces 
  humans > animals unfamiliar faces 
  humans > animals unfamiliar faces 
Filippi et al. 2013 The "vegetarian brain": chatting with 
monkeys and pigs? 
humans > monkeys unfamiliar faces 
  humans > monkeys unfamiliar faces 
  humans > monkeys unfamiliar faces 
  humans > pigs unfamiliar faces 
  humans > pigs unfamiliar faces 
  humans > pigs unfamiliar faces 
Gervais et al. 2004 Abnormal cortical voice processing in 
autism 
humans > tools, 
animals 
unfamiliar voices 
Gorno Tempini 
and Price 
2001 Identification of famous faces and 
buildings. A functional neuroimaging 
study of semantically unique items 
humans > places familiar, 
unfamiliar 
faces 
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Authors Date Title Contrast Familiarity 
Stimulus 
type 
Grabowski et al. 2001 A role for left temporal pole in the 
retrieval of words for unique entities 
humans > places familiar, 
unfamiliar 
faces 
  humans > places familiar faces 
  humans > places unfamiliar faces 
  humans > places familiar, 
unfamiliar 
faces 
Harvey et al. 2007 Modulation of memory formation by 
stimulus content: specific role of the 
medial prefrontal cortex in the 
successful encoding of social pictures 
humans > 
objects 
unfamiliar faces 
Hasson et al. 2002 Eccentricity bias as an organizing 
principle for human high-order object 
areas 
humans > letter, 
buildings 
unfamiliar faces 
Haxby et al. 1999 The effect of face inversion on activity 
in human neural systems for face and 
object perception 
humans > places unfamiliar faces 
Ishai et al. 1999 Distributed 
representation of objects in the human 
ventral visual pathway 
humans > places unfamiliar faces 
Ishai et al. 2000 The representation of objects in the 
human occipital and temporal cortex 
humans > places unfamiliar faces 
Ishai et al. 2000 Distributed neural systems for the 
generation of visual images 
humans > places unfamiliar faces 
Kujala et al. 2012 Dog experts’ brains distinguish socially 
relevant body postures similarly in 
dogs and humans 
humans > dogs unfamiliar faces, 
body  
  humans > dogs unfamiliar faces, 
body  
Nakamura et al. 2000 Functional delineation of the human 
occipito-temporal areas related to face 
and scene processing 
humans > places familiar faces 
Pourtois et al. 2005 View-independent coding of face 
identity in frontal and temporal 
cortices is modulated by familiarity: an 
event-related fMRI study 
humans > places familiar, 
unfamiliar 
faces 
Ross and Olson 2010 Social cognition and the anterior 
temporal lobes 
humans > 
animals 
unfamiliar words 
Scherf et al. 2007 Visual category-selectivity for faces, 
places and objects emerges along 
different developmental trajectories 
humans > places, 
objects 
unfamiliar faces 
Simmons et al. 2010 The selectivity and functional 
connectivity of the anterior temporal 
lobes 
humans > places unfamiliar words 
  humans > tools unfamiliar words 
Skipper et al. 2011 Sensory and semantic category 
subdivisions within the anterior 
temporal lobes 
humans > 
animals 
unfamiliar words 
Straube et al. 2010 Social cues, mentalizing and the neural 
processing of speech accompanied by 
gestures 
humans > places unfamiliar faces 
Zahn et al. 2007 Social concepts are represented in the 
superior anterior temporal cortex 
humans > 
animals 
unfamiliar words 
Note. The table shows all the studies included in the meta-analysis 
 31 
Figure 1 
 
Note. The figure shows the results of the meta-analysis 
 
Table 2 
Cluster Volume 
(mm3) 
Coordinates ALE value 
(*103) 
Hemisphere AAL Label 
X Y Z    
1 12616 42 -56 -4 35.8 Right Inferior fusiform gyrus 
       Inferior temporal gyrus 
Middle temporal gyrus 
Inferior occipital gyrus 
2 11640 40 -7 -11 33.37 Right Amygdala 
       Hippocampus 
Parahippocampal gyrus  
       Superior temporal gyrus 
       Middle temporal gyrus 
3 4304 -1 -55 25 27.62 Left Posterior cingulate 
4 4272 -41 -71 -10 17.68 Left Fusiform gyrus 
       Inferior occipital gyrus 
5 4016 -38 -49 -21 30.46 Left Fusiform gyrus 
6 2864 -19 -10 -9 16.51 Left Inferior temporal gyrus 
Parahippocampal gyrus 
       Hippocampus 
Amygdala 
       Thalamus 
7 2704 -49 -53 19 14.57 Left Superior temporal gyrus 
       Inferior parietal lobule 
8 2488 -4 48 38 16.55 Left Medial frontal gyrus 
       Superior frontal gyrus 
      Right Medial frontal gyrus 
9 2344 -42 15 23 24.27 Left Inferior frontal gyrus 
Note. The table shows the results of the meta-analysis. Coordinates are reported in the 
Talaraich space  
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1.4.3 Results 
I obtained a total of 9 clusters (see Figure 1 and Table 2) including: bilateral occipital 
lobes (inferior occipital gyri), bilateral temporal lobes (fusiform gyri, superior temporal gyri, 
middle temporal gyrus, parahippocampal gyri and amygdala), left frontal lobe (inferior frontal 
gyrus and superior medial frontal gyrus), left posterior cingulate and left inferior parietal 
lobe.  
1.4.5 Discussion 
The aim of the current meta-analysis was to document whether previous studies 
identified areas that were selectively associated with knowledge about conspecifics, 
regardless of the modality of presentation of the stimuli. The selected studies included both 
verbal and non-verbal stimuli, presented in the visual or auditory modality. Results 
highlighted several areas that are thought to be involved in processing conspecifics at 
different levels; these areas range from perceptual areas, such as the inferior occipital and 
temporal cortices or superior temporal cortex, to affective processing areas such as the 
amygdala, medial prefrontal cortex and posterior inferior frontal gyrus, to high-order 
cognitive areas, as posterior cingulate and temporo-parietal junction. 
The emergence of perceptual areas, including bilateral visual processing cortices 
(clusters 1, 4, and 5), such as the inferior occipital and fusiform gyri, (OFA and the FFA) and 
an auditory processing area located at the level of right superior temporal gyrus (cluster 2), 
confirmed the evidence of specialized human processing areas within the visual and auditory 
systems (see Gainotti et al., 2015, for a recent review). It is worth noting that, while 
activations of the visual system were bilateral, activations of auditory system were only 
located within the right hemisphere.  
Results also showed the involvement of bilateral amygdala (clusters 2 and 6) and 
medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) (cluster 8), areas that are widely inter-connected with each 
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other and very often associated to emotional and social stimuli processing (see Fossati, 2012, 
for review). The role of the amygdala in emotional processing has been widely investigated in 
both human brain imaging and animal studies. Specifically, amygdala function has been found 
to be associated with fear conditioning, an experimental paradigm in which a neutral stimulus 
might induce defensive behaviour as effect of emotional learning (Phelps and LeDoux, 2005; 
Bückel and Dolan, 2000). Moreover, as a consequence of a lesion of the amygdala, individuals 
tend to show impaired fear processing, perceiving a reduced experience of fear (Feinstein et 
al., 2011). More recently other evidence challenged the notion of amygdala as an area 
dedicated to processing aversive stimuli (Öhman and Mineka, 2001). In fact, the amygdala 
was found to be active even in presence of positive stimuli (Sergerie et al., 2008), thus 
suggesting that it might well be involved in processing self-relevant stimuli (Fossati, 2012).  
Conversely, MPFC that is part of the default mode network (DMN) has been associated 
with several different functions (Roy et al., 2012). Indeed, it was found to be relevant in 
emotion (Wager et al., 2008), economic evaluation (Rangel and Hare, 2010), theory of mind 
(Amodio and Frith, 2006), semantic memory (Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Binder et al., 2009) 
and endocrine/autonomic regulation (Fellows and Farah, 2003). Taken together, these 
findings led some authors to suggest that MPFC might work as a hub, integrating many 
different inputs, and representing conceptual knowledge useful for survival and translating 
this knowledge into affective behavioural and physiological responses (Roy et al., 2012).  
Another important area which lighted up in my meta-analysis was the left inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG) (cluster 9), which is quite often found to be active in many fMRI studies 
and its function has been associated to semantic processing, phonological processing and 
working memory (Liakakis et al., 2011). In the current meta-analysis, I found a significant 
cluster located within the posterior part of IFG, which is held to process facial emotions as 
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both neuroimaging on healthy participant and patients’ studies showed (Blakemore, 2008; 
Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009). 
We also found bilateral activations within the temporo-parietal junctions (clusters 1 
and 7). This area has commonly been found activated in social and attentional (i.e., re-
orienting of attention) tasks (Carter and Huettel, 2013; Krall et al., 2016). Specifically, TPJ 
activation is particularly consistent in experiments on theory of mind, in which participants 
are required to infer other person’s mental states (Saxe, 2010).  
The role of PCC (cluster 3) is more controversial. If on the one hand it is acknowledged 
that it is part of the DMN (Raichle et al., 2001), and particularly active during autobiographical 
retrieval and planning future events (Buckner et al., 2007), suggesting that it might support 
internally driven cognition, on the other different studies highlighted the role of the PCC in 
regulating the focus of attention (Gusnard and Raichle, 2001; Hampson et al., 2006; Hahn et 
al., 2007). 
Taken together our results showed a network of areas involved in the selective 
processing of conspecifics, including perceptual, emotional and high-order processing areas. 
This meta-analysis while it offers a picture of the relevant network involved in processing 
conspecifics, however it does not allow disentangling different theories. While the existence of 
a dedicated network for processing conspecifics supports the DSH, the activation of modality-
specific areas (including emotions) speaks in favour of sustain the CZT or the CTT. This issue 
required to be tested with ad-hoc studies that will be presented in the following chapters. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
The neural network associated with lexical-semantic 
knowledge about social groups 
 
This chapter is a modified version of the following paper: Piretti, L., Carnaghi, A., 
Campanella, F., Ambron, E., Skrap, M., & Rumiati, R. I. (2015). The neural network associated 
with lexical-semantic knowledge about social groups. Cortex, 70, 155-168. 
 
Abstract 
A person can be appraised as an individual or as a member of a social group. In the present 
study we tested whether the knowledge about social groups is represented independently of 
the living and non-living things. Patients with frontal and temporal lobe tumors involving 
either the left or the right hemisphere performed three tasks - picture naming, word-to-
picture matching and picture sorting - tapping the lexical semantic knowledge of living things, 
non-living things and social groups. Both behavioural and voxel-based lesion-symptom 
mapping (VLSM) analyses suggested that social groups might be represented differently from 
other categories. VLSM analysis carried out on naming errors revealed that left–lateralized 
lesions in the inferior frontal gyrus, amygdala, insula and basal ganglia were associated with 
the lexical-semantic processing of social groups. These findings indicate that the social group 
representation may rely on areas associated with affective processing. 
2.1 Introduction 
Humans can be appraised as individuals or as members of social groups. When 
encountering Hillary Clinton, for instance, we might recognize her as an individual, 
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characterized by idiosyncratic features (e.g., her name, her psychological states or 
characteristics, such as extroversion), or as a member of a broader group (e.g., woman, 
politician, American). Based on neuropsychological evidence, and corroborated by 
neuroimaging studies (Haxby et al., 2002; Tsukiura et al., 2006), it has been suggested that the 
appraisal of our conspecifics involves distinct stages, including the person perception (their 
face, voice, gait and mannerisms), the semantic knowledge about other persons and the lexical 
retrieval of their names (Bruce & Young, 1986; Campanella et al., 2013). The evidence 
supporting the organization of the person related information in three different processing 
levels will be discussed in the following.  
First, patients suffering from apperceptive prosopagnosia are impaired at forming the 
representation of faces from visual inputs such as age, ethnicity and gender (Young and Ellis, 
1989; Kracke, 1994; de Haan and Campbell, 1991) following lesions in occipito-temporal 
areas (see Davies-Thompson et a., 2014, for a recent review). On the other hand, patients with 
associative prosopagnosia and lesions of the right anterior temporal lobe (ATL), after having 
formed a face representation successfully, may fail to associate an identity to a face structure 
(e.g., De Renzi, 1986; Farah et al., 1995).  
Second, what we know about the identity of other people, in addition to the person-
specific knowledge, also includes their psychological or internal states (social concepts, e.g., 
loyal; Zahn et al., 2007) and the knowledge about the social group an individual primarily 
belongs to (i.e., social groups). Thus, while recognizing Hillary Clinton as an individual implies 
to link some specific perceptual features to unique semantic and lexical features (Gorno 
Tempini and Price, 2001), including knowledge about social concepts (Zahn et al., 2007), 
identifying her as a woman relies on a more general knowledge that can be applied to many 
other individuals who have in common the characteristic of being a woman.  
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Third, even if the face structure and semantic and social identity have been correctly 
built, there might be patients who are unable to retrieve specific names of people they are 
supposed to know, despite showing intact person-specific knowledge and being still able to 
name living and non-living things (McKenna and Warrington, 1980; Lucchelli and De Renzi, 
1992). This deficit, called proper name anomia, is caused by lesions in the left temporal pole 
that often affects also famous landmark naming (Gainotti, 2007). 
In the current study we set out to investigate visual, semantic and lexical processes 
involving social groups, living things and non-living things in patients with brain tumors and 
neurologically intact individuals. As suggested by several strands of evidence that we will 
briefly review in the following sections, people’s lexical-semantic knowledge about both the 
individual and social group level is likely to be represented independently of what they know 
about living and non-living things. 
A first piece of evidence is provided by a double dissociation between patients with 
encephalitis, neurodegenerative diseases and traumatic brain injury with a person-specific 
knowledge deficit (i.e., loss of biographical information about famous people) but spared 
knowledge about other categories (Hanley et al., 1989; Evans et al., 1995, Miceli et al., 2000), 
and patients with the opposite and less frequent pattern, that is spared knowledge about 
conspecifics but a loss of knowledge about other categories such as animals, vegetables, and 
tools (Kay and Hanley, 2002; Lyons et al., 2006; Thompson et al., 2004). A similar dissociation 
between social concepts and animal concepts (animal behaviours and properties) has been 
observed in patients with fronto-temporal dementia, especially those with a more 
pronounced hypometabolism in the anterior temporal lobe (Zahn et al., 2009). This is the 
same region that lighted up when, in an fMRI study with healthy individuals, social concepts 
were compared with concepts about animal functions (Zahn et al., 2007), or with clothes and 
fruit (Mitchell et al., 2002). In addition, processing social concepts also led to the activation of 
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the dorso-medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) and left parieto-temporal junction (TPJ) 
(Mitchell et al., 2002; Zahn et al., 2007).  
Overall, this neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence seems to suggest that 
person-specific knowledge (including social concepts) and knowledge about living and non-
living things might be supported, at least in part, by different neuromechanisms. By contrast, 
only a few studies have addressed the issue of whether the knowledge about social groups - 
defined as categories of individuals that share common category-relevant characteristics 
and/or features (Contreras et al., 2011; Rumiati et al., 2014) - is represented independently of 
the knowledge about other categories and has brain correlates of its own. In a 
neuropsychological study, Rumiati et al. (2014) found that patients with a presumptive 
diagnosis of dementia double dissociated in performing word sorting tasks of living things, 
non-living things and social groups. Likewise, using fMRI, Contreras et al. (2011) found an 
activation of the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), posterior cingulate (PCC) and bilateral TPJ 
when contrasting social groups versus non-social objects (artifacts and animals) in a feature 
verification task, and an activation of left inferior frontal gyrus (lIFG) and infero-temporal 
cortex when contrasting non-social versus social stimuli. The double dissociations between 
the different categories (social groups, living things and non-living things) observed in 
patients with dementia (Rumiati et al., 2014), and the different sites of activation for social 
and non-social stimuli (Contreras et al., 2011), indicate that social groups may constitute a 
category independent of other living or non-living categories. However, although these two 
studies have the general common goal of assessing the status of the representations about 
social groups, they are not directly comparable as they differed for the stimuli, tasks and 
methods used. In the former study (Rumiati et al., 2014), patients sorted names of different 
entities into categories including social groups, while in the latter (Contreras et al., 2011) they 
had to decide which of two groups was related to a specific stereotype-congruent behaviour 
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or attitude. Moreover, it remains unclear which are the brain areas that when lesioned may 
give rise to a deficit in processing social groups, as in Rumiati et al. (2014) the behavioural 
deficit could not be correlated with brain volumes in the patients with dementia. This lack of 
information does not allow us to argue that the knowledge about social groups recruits a 
neural network distinct from those recruited by living and non-living things, as tentatively 
suggested by Contreras et al. (2011).  
That the knowledge about conspecifics might be independent of other types of 
knowledge (i.e., living and non-living things) is still a matter of debate. Indeed, the severe 
multi-modal semantic impairments observed in patients with semantic dementia - a 
neurodegenerative disease associated to ATLs atrophy - led to suggest that ATL serves as an 
amodal semantic “hub” in which inputs from different modality-specific brain areas converge 
and are integrated (the hub-and-spoke theory, Rogers et al., 2004; Patterson et al., 2007). 
Hence multi-modal representations of concepts are held to be housed in the ATL. More 
recently damage to the ATL has also been linked to inappropriate social behaviours (Chan et 
al., 2009), to social concepts impairment (Zahn et al., 2009) and to person-specific knowledge 
(Olson et al., 2012). Based on this evidence, some authors suggested that the ATL may play a 
critical role in representing social (social knowledge hypothesis of ATL, Skipper et al., 2011; 
Olson et al., 2012).  
One critical aspect that should be taken into account is the specificity of the stimuli. 
Evidence in support of the hub-and-spoke theory is by and large provided by cases of 
semantic dementia, a condition that is characterized, even at early stages, by the loss of 
specific knowledge, with patients naming for instance a chicken “bird” or “animal”, while the 
superordinate knowledge remains available for a longer time (e.g., Patterson et al., 2007). In 
contrast, evidence in support of the social knowledge hypothesis mostly relies on studies in 
which the person knowledge has been investigated only at a very specific level of 
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representation (i.e., famous or familiar persons). It is worth noting that specific level entities 
are also more demanding for the semantic system, and that some recent fMRI (Visser and 
Lambon Ralph, 2011) and TMS (Pobric et al., 2007) studies showed that the ATL is also 
implicated in processing subordinate or basic level concepts. Thus, there are three possible 
hypotheses about the role played by ATL: it might only deal with the specific-level of 
processing (irrespective of the category), as suggested by Martin (2007), it might selectively 
process social knowledge (Skipper et al., 2011) or it might represent multimodal semantic 
concepts (Rogers et al., 2004).  
Moreover, the relative contribution of left and right ATL in processing person 
knowledge remains undecided. In fact, according to Thompson et al. (2004), person 
knowledge is cross-modal and likely to be represented as a category within the right ATL, 
while general semantic processing may rely on left ATL. However, in Snowden et al.’s view 
(2004; 2012), person knowledge, as general semantic knowledge, is expected to be 
represented in modality-specific areas, with the right ATL being important for visual 
processing, and the left ATL for verbal processing. 
Patients with unilateral brain damage have been reported with impaired performance on 
tasks involving verbal production as in picture naming, but spared recognition abilities 
(Lambon Ralph et al., 2010; Lambon Ralph et al., 2012; Drane et al., 2008). Moreover, patients 
with semantic dementia tend to show different types of impairment depending on the 
predominant laterality of the atrophy, with patients with more pronounced left atrophy 
showing disproportionate production impairment compared to comprehension, and patients 
with a more pronounced right atrophy showing a similar impairment in production and 
comprehension (Lambon Ralph et al., 2001). The explanation of these findings is still a matter 
of debate. On the one hand, Snowden et al. (2004) proposed that the right ATL is involved in 
processing visual stimuli, and the left ATL in processing verbal stimuli, while on the other, 
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Rogers et al. (2004) proposed a model in which semantic knowledge is stored in bilateral 
areas and includes partially redundant information. Damage to the left semantic storage, 
which provides the main inputs to a left-sided phonological area, will impair verbal 
production, while damage to the right ATL will not lead to any impairment, since semantic 
information is redundant in the two hemispheres. 
We used social groups as stimuli to test a level of specificity different from the one 
normally investigated with familiar and famous people (e.g., Gainotti, 2007). More in general, 
this study evaluated whether, relative to healthy controls, the performance of patients with a 
unilateral left or right hemisphere tumor in the temporal or frontal lobe on three different 
tasks differed across categories depending on the side and site of the lesion. As expected on 
the basis on previous studies (Rumiati et al., 2014; Contreras et al., 2011), we hypothesized 
that, if the knowledge about social groups is independent of other categories (living and non-
living things), the patients’ impaired performance on social groups should be caused by 
lesions in brain areas that are different from those affecting the performance with the other 
categories.   
More specifically, if the knowledge about other humans, including social groups, is 
represented in distinct modality-dependent areas as proposed by Snowden et al. (2004), left-
brain damaged patients (LBD) should be more impaired than both right-brain damaged 
patients (RBD) and healthy controls with verbal tasks involving social groups. On the other 
hand, RBD patients were expected to be more impaired when performing visual tasks than 
both LBD and healthy controls. Conversely, if the knowledge about conspecifics is represented 
categorically within the right ATL (as suggested by Thompson et al., 2004), RBD patients 
should have impaired knowledge about social groups, and LBD patients should have impaired 
knowledge about living and non-living things. The hub-and-spokes theory and the social 
knowledge hypothesis do not seem to make any clear prediction as to the lateralization of the 
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deficit. Only we can say is that the former predicts that the impairment on all the three 
categories should be associated to overlapping lesioned areas within the ATL, and the latter 
that the impairment in processing social groups should be associated with lesions to specific 
areas. As mentioned earlier, imaging studies reported frontal areas also implicated in the 
evaluation of social groups and in representing mental states of social groups. Thus, if the 
evaluation and the mental state attribution were an epiphenomenon of social group 
processing, lesions of the medial prefrontal cortex should not affect patients’ performance 
with social groups. However if the evaluation and/or mental state attribution are necessary to 
fully access the knowledge about social groups, the lesion in this region of the cortex should 
damage the mental state processing or group evaluation resulting in a reduced performance 
on social groups (for a similar rationale, see Zahn et al., 2007). We also expected that a deficit 
in processing non-living things correlated with the left posterior middle temporal gyrus and, 
the deficit in processing living things with the lateral part of the fusiform gyrus and superior 
temporal sulcus (Martin, 2007, for a review).  
The same set of stimuli was used in the three different tasks that tapped the lexical-
semantic processes in order to identify at which processing level the deficit occurred. While, 
picture naming requires intact visual recognition and verbal production, word-to-picture 
matching taps both visual and verbal recognition of the item, bypassing verbal production. 
Moreover, the analysis of participants’ error types in the naming task were also analysed to 
further characterize the locus of the deficit, with circumlocutions and anomias indicating a 
faulty lexical-semantic processing, and visual errors tapping a perceptual deficit. The picture 
sorting task, that aims at establishing the integrity of the knowledge about the category the 
stimulus belongs to, does not require participants to access to the specific knowledge about a 
stimulus (e.g., dog) but only to its superordinate (e.g., living).  We included in the study 
patients with different tumor histologic types (i.e., high grade gliomas, low grade gliomas, 
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meningiomas, and metastasis). Although their growing rate is quite heterogeneous across 
patients and, as such, it consequently may give rise to compensation effects (i.e., patients with 
LGG show cognitive deficits only in 10-20% of cases, see DeAngelis, 2001), testing both HGG 
and LGG patients after surgery might reveal impaired cognitive functions (Campanella et al., 
2015).  
2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Participants 
 Thirty-five patients (10 females, age = 49.2±15.2, education = 12.1±4.1) with 
unilateral brain tumors either in the left or right hemisphere, and twenty-five healthy 
participants (14 females, age = 54.8±13.7, education = 11.6±4.0) took part in the study (see, 
Table 3). Patients’ lesions were located either in the left frontal lobe (LF, N = 10), left temporal 
lobe (LT, NN = 10), right frontal lobe (RF, N = 7), or right temporal lobe (RT, N = 8). If the 
lesion involved both the frontal and the temporal lobes, the patient was assigned to either one 
or the other group depending on which lobe was more affected by the tumor (and decided 
after detecting the center of the lesion after normalization).  Unfortunately our sample does 
not include patients with right temporal pole lesions. According to the histology, our sample 
included 18 high grade gliomas (HGG), 11 low grade gliomas (LGG), 5 meningiomas and one 
metastasis. Chi-square analysis showed that tumor type did not differ across patient groups 
(2 (3) = 3.05, p = .38). The exclusion criteria were the presence of neurological or psychiatric 
disease, previous brain surgery and diffuse lesions (e.g., gliomatosis cerebri). Healthy controls 
were selected to match patients for age and education. 
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Table 3: Participants’ demographic information. 
Group Side Site N Age (SD)  Education (SD) Days after surgery (SD) 
LF Left Frontal 10 53.5 (16.7) 11.9 (3.7) 7.7 (2.1) 
LT  Temporal 10 47.3 (15.4) 10.7 (3.9) 6.4 (0.8) 
RF Right Frontal 7 42.7 (16.6) 13.1 (5.1) 8.3 (3.0) 
RT  Temporal 8 51.8 (11.5) 13.0 (4.4) 6.9 (4.0) 
Controls   25 54.8 (13.7) 11.6 (4.0) - 
Note. Mean age, education and delay between surgery and experimental examination (days after surgery). 
 
 
Table 4: Neuropsychological assessment 
Group Token Flu FAB Rey-fig 
copy 
Benton Vis 
search 
Star Span-f Span-b Corsi Prose Rey-fig 
del 
LF 
27.3 
(8.6) 
17.6 
(15.8) 
14.4 
(1.0) 
29.8 
(5.5) 
22.3 
(3.0) 
41.4 
(15.7) 
53.8 
(0.4) 
4.7 
(1.3) 
3.3 
(0.9) 
4.0 
(0.5) 
15.9 
(2.8) 
15.1 
(4.1) 
LT 
26.6 
(6.0) 
30.5 
(21.0) 
14.5 
(2.8) 
31.8 
(3.3) 
24.2 
(2.1) 
42.9 
(11.3) 
53.8 
(0.6) 
4.2 
(1.1) 
4.2 
(1.4) 
4.5 
(1.0) 
12.4 
(3.9) 
19.0 
(5.0) 
RF 
32.2 
(1.1) 
35.1 
(9.4) 
15.7 
(1.2) 
27.3 
(5.1) 
22.0 
(2.3) 
44.5 
(5.3) 
53.1 
(1.9) 
5.1 
(1.6) 
4.1 
(1.1) 
4.3 
(1.0) 
18.1 
(4.3) 
17.0 
(6.0) 
RT 
32.5 
(0.9) 
45.6 
(16.6) 
15.6 
(1.7) 
28.6 
(6.1) 
21.4 
(2.4) 
40.9 
(14.5) 
53.3 
(1.0) 
6.0 
(1.2) 
5.1 
(1.6) 
5.3 
(0.8) 
20.4 
(2.3) 
15.4 
(4.7) 
Note. Patients’ mean scores and standard deviations on the neuropsychological battery: Token + Token test, Spinnler and Tognoni, 1987; 
Flu = Verbal fluency, Carlesimo et al., 1995; FAB = Frontal Assessment Battery, Apollonio et al., 2005; Rey-fig copy = Rey Figure immediate 
copy, Caffarra et al., 2002; Benton = Benton facial recognition test, Benton et al., 1990; Vis search = Visual search, Spinnler and Tognoni, 
1987; Star = Star Cancellation, Wilson et al., 1987; Span-f = Digit span forward, Orsini et al., 1987; Span-b = Digit span backward – 
qualitative score, Orsini et al., 1987; Corsi = Corsi spatial span, Orsini et al., 1987; Prose = Memory of Prose, Novelli et al., 1987; Rey-fig del = 
Rey Figure delayed copy, Caffarra et al., 2002. 
 45 
2.2.2 Neuropsychological assessment 
After surgery to remove the tumor, patients underwent a neuropsychological 
assessment (Table 4) of language (Token test), executive functions (Frontal Assessment 
Battery, FAB, verbal fluency), attention (visual search, stars cancellation), face recognition 
(Benton Facial Recognition), visuo-spatial ability (Rey figure copy) short- (digit span forward 
and backwards, Corsi spatial span) and long-term memory (Memory of Prose, Rey figure 
delayed copy).  
2.2.3 Experimental tasks 
The experiment was approved by the SISSA ethics committee, and all patients gave 
their informed consent to participate to the study. The experimental tasks were administered 
7 days after surgery (± 3) in a different session from the neuropsychological assessment, and 
lasted nearly one hour. Stimuli included 45 coloured pictures divided into three categories: 
living things (N = 15; animals, plants), non-living things (N = 15; tools, clothes, means of 
transport) and social groups (N = 15; a subset of stimuli used by Rumiati et al., 2014, e.g., 
Asians, clerks, obese) (see Table 5 for the complete list of items). Since our aim was to test the 
knowledge about social groups, which is a basic/superordinate type of knowledge, and not 
person-specific knowledge, we did not include pictures of famous people. 
In order to choose the experimental stimuli two pilot studies were performed. In the 
first study we selected the social groups. A sample of 44 Italian native speakers was asked to 
generate names with which people tend to categorize other people. We then selected the 20 
most frequent names from those indicated by the participants. Then pictures of 20 socials 
groups, 20 pictures of living things, and 20 of non-living things were presented to 19 healthy 
participants. The final 45 pictures (15 for each category) were chosen among those that 
reached the highest name agreement. The stimuli belonging to the three categories were 
matched for letter length and written frequency (all ps > .05), and were used in three different  
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Table 5 
Category Item Translation 
Living albero tree 
 
farfalla butterfly 
 
cane dog 
 
tartaruga tortoise 
 
castagna chestnut 
 
peperone pepper 
 
serpente snake 
 
gatto cat 
 
coccodrillo crocodile 
 
coniglio rabbit 
 
elefante elephant 
 
fiore flower 
 
cavallo horse 
 
pappagallo parrot 
 
mela apple 
Non-Living cappello hat 
 
bicchiere glass 
 
Borsa bag 
 
cacciavite screwdriver 
 
Finestra window 
 
occhiali glasses, spectacles 
 
schiaccianoci nutcracker 
 
chiave key 
 
cucchiaio spoon 
 
bottiglia bottle 
 
posacenere ashtray 
 
automobile car 
 
piatto plate 
 
forchetta fork 
 
elicottero helicopter 
Social groups musulmani Muslims 
 
immigrati Immigrants 
 
giovani Youth 
 
anziani Elderly 
 
cinesi Chineese people 
 
europei Europeans 
 
donne Women 
 
laureati Graduate 
 
obesi Obese people 
 
studenti Students 
 
omosessuali Homosexuals 
 
impiegati Employee 
 
politici Politicians 
 
africani Africans 
 
disabili Disabled 
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tasks: picture naming, word-to-picture matching and picture sorting. In addition, we collected 
age-of-acquisition (AoA) and familiarity scores for all 45 stimuli. AoA has been found to 
influence picture naming performance (Brown and Watson, 1987; Papeo et al., 2010), with 
items acquired earlier tending to be more resilient to damage compared to items learnt later 
in development (Morrison et al., 2003; see also Papeo et al., 2010). A total number of 18 
healthy individuals rated at which age they acquired the knowledge for each word presented 
(45 items presented in random order), using a 1 to 7 Likert scale, with 1 indicating up to three 
years, 2 between four and five years, and so on, up to 7 that indicated more than 13 years. 
Then the same participants also rated how familiar they were with the same words, using a 1 
to 7 Likert scale (1 totally unfamiliar, 7 completely familiar). The AoA ratings differed across 
semantic categories (all ps < .01); in particular, living things were reported as being acquired 
earlier (less than three years) than social groups later (between 8 and 9 years) and non-living 
things (between the four and five years). Familiarity ratings significantly differed only 
between non-living things and social groups (p < .05), with social groups being less familiar 
than non-living things. Moreover, Spearman’s correlations between the mean accuracy across 
patients were calculated for each item belonging to the three categories and the 
corresponding AoA and familiarity ratings.  Results showed that living things and non-living 
things (but not social groups) significantly correlated with each variable. We performed a 
multiple backward regression analysis, using as dependent variable the average patients’ 
scores for each item and as independent variable the stimuli’s AoA, the familiarity and 
category. The analysis revealed that AoA was the only significant predictor (B = -.068, Beta = -
.721, p < .05), accounting for the 37 % of naming variance. We also explored the relative 
contribution of AoA to the performance on each category. We carried out the same analysis 
(except for category, that was not used as predictor), for each of the three categories. The 
analyses revealed that the model was not significant for both living things and social groups, 
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while for non-living things AoA significantly accounted for the 48% of variance (B = -.056, 
Beta = -.691, p < .001). The order of the stimuli and of the tasks was the same across 
participants. 
2.2.3.1. Picture naming task 
Participants were presented with 45 consecutive coloured photographs (each sized 
13x21 cm), each printed on the center of an A4 sheet in a landscape orientation, and asked to 
name them as accurately as possible. These stimuli belonging to the three categories (living 
things, non-living things, social groups) were presented in pseudorandom order. This task 
required participants to accurately perceive the stimuli, associate them with the 
corresponding meanings, and retrieve their nouns. To prevent participants from naming 
pictures too specifically or too generally, we excluded pictures of famous people and selected 
photographs depicting groups of people with salient group-specific features. Participants’ 
accuracy and type of errors were recorded and categorized into different types. Participants’ 
errors were categorized as follows: good circumlocutions (when patients provide a relatively 
good description of the target word, e.g., “The man’s best friend”, following the presentation of 
the picture of a dog), poor circumlocutions (when patients provide a 
rather impoverished description of the target word, e.g., “The animal with fur”), anomias 
(when patients do not produce any word), semantic paraphasias (the patients’ response is 
semantically related to the target word, e.g., “kennel” for ‘dog’), verbal paraphasias (the 
patients’ response is not related to the target word, e.g., ceiling instead of ‘dog’), phonological 
paraphasias (the patients’ response differs from the target word for one phoneme, e.g., “dob” 
instead of ‘dog’), visual errors (the patients’ response denote an item that is perceptually 
similar to the one denoted by the target word, e.g., table), and visual-semantic errors (this is 
the case of a response that can shares both visual and semantic characteristics with the target 
e.g., “fox” instead of “dog”. The error analysis can contribute to identify the locus of the 
 49 
eventual breakdown (e.g., degraded storage, impaired access to the semantic store, impaired 
lexical access). 
2.2.3.2 Word-to-picture matching task 
In this task, patients were asked to indicate among four alternatives, which photograph 
corresponded to the target named by the examiner. Participants were presented with 4 
coloured photographs, (each sized 8x12 cm), randomly arranged in a 2x2 matrix on an A4 
paper sheet in a landscape orientation. In addition to the target (e.g., African-Americans), the 
remaining three photographs used a distractors belonged to the same category as the target 
(e.g., students, homosexuals and disables). On each trial, the participants were asked to point 
to the picture that matched the noun uttered by the experimenter, for a total of 45 trials. 
Target stimuli were the same as in the picture naming.  
2.2.3.3 Picture sorting tasks 
The participants performed three consecutive picture-sorting tasks (30 trials for each 
sorting task, including 15 related to one category and 15 related to another one). On each 
sorting, the participants were presented with a block of coloured cards (each sized 10.5 x15 
cm) randomly shuffled, depicted each an experimental stimulus. Stimuli belonged to two 
categories and participants were asked to place each of them under two labels: living things 
and non-living things (sorting 1), living things and social groups (sorting 2), and non-living 
things and social groups (sorting 3). To perform this task participants must access to the 
knowledge of the category the item belongs to. As such, the task does not necessarily require 
to access to the specific knowledge about a particular exemplar, but only to the information 
about its superordinate.  
 
 
 
 50 
2.2.4 Statistical analyses 
A series of univariate analyses of variance (ANOVA) with side (left, right) and site 
(frontal, temporal) as a between subject factors, and the patients’ scores on the 
neuropsychological tests as the dependent variables (Token test, Verbal fluency, Frontal 
Assessment Battery, Visual Search, Stars Cancellation, Benton Facial Recognition, Rey Figure 
immediate and delayed copy, Digit span forward, Corsi spatial span and Memory of Prose) 
was performed in order to highlight possible cognitive differences between the patient groups 
on the different tests. 
A repeated-measures ANOVA was performed on the naming accuracy scores of each 
category of stimuli as dependent variable, with category (living things, non-living things and 
social groups) as within-subject factor, and side (left, right) and site of lesion (frontal, 
temporal) as between-subject factors. Moreover to compare patients and controls, we 
performed a series of independent sample t-tests between each group performance on the 
three categories and healthy controls’. 
Since the histology of the tumor is thought to influence the growing rate of the tumor 
mass, and consequently lead to compensation effects, we performed again the same ANOVA, 
adding the tumor type as between-subject factor. It is worth noting that we considered two 
main tumor types, based on the histological grading of the tumor: high grade included fast 
growing tumors that tend to infiltrate adjacent tissues (HGG and metastasis) and lead to more 
severe deficits, whereas low grade tumors (LGG, meningiomas) tend to increase their volume 
slowly and compress neighbouring tissues. 
Mann-Whitney U tests were performed on each error type using the percentage of 
errors as a dependent variable and patient sub-groups as independent variable. Moreover two 
series of Spearman’s correlations (one on RBD patients and the other on LDB patients) were 
performed between patients’ raw naming scores on each semantic category, and scores on the 
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neuropsychological tests; the magnitude of the correlations between LBD and RBD patients 
was also tested. Finally, to confirm that the level of specificity (i.e., the extent to which a 
concept can be applied to different entities) of the items was similar for the three categories, 
we had 12 participants rate the level of specificity of each word on a Likert scale ranging from 
1 (general) to 7 (specific). A few examples were provided to be sure that participants 
understood the task (e.g., a list of words ranging from general to specific: “animal, mammal, 
elephant, white elephant, Dumbo”).  
2.2.5 Lesion Analysis 
In order to compare the patients’ performance on the experimental tasks with brain 
lesions we performed a first voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping (VLSM, Bates et al., 2003). 
This analysis sorts for every voxel two distinct groups of patients (lesioned, not lesioned), and 
then compares the behavioural performance of the two groups, returning maps of areas 
associated with behavioural deficits. On each patient’ structural MRI (T1 or T2-weighted), a 
region of interest (ROI) was traced on each horizontal slice using MRIcron software 
(http://www.mccauslandcenter.sc.edu/mricro/mricron). Lesions were mapped using 
patients’ preoperative MRI scans, as in post-operative MRI scans parenchymal dislocations 
may lead to biases in the lesion mapping (see Campanella et al., 2014, for similar procedure 
and argument). Both the patients’ scans and ROIs were then normalized using spm8 software, 
in order to be comparable (see Figure 2, for lesion overlap maps).  
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Figure 2 
 
Note: The figure shows the extension of the lesions in the four subgroups of patients. 
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Then the NPM (non-parametric mapping, 
(http://www.mccauslandcenter.sc.edu/mricro/mricron) software was used to perform the 
VLSM, setting the Brunner-Munzel test and 1000 permutations, and ignoring voxels lesioned 
in less than three patients. A first VLSM was performed using as dependent variable a score 
obtained by subtracting the average accuracy score on the picture naming task from the 
picture naming scores for each of the three categories. This computation allows us to show 
the specific contribution of each of the three categories, ignoring general naming deficits. A 
second VLSM analysis was performed using the patients’ errors on the picture naming task as 
continuous behavioural variable. To perform such analysis we computed the error ratio 
between the absolute error rate on each error type (divided by category), and the naming 
accuracy for each patient. Then, for each error type, we subtracted the average error rate for 
each category from the error rate (divided by category) and we used this score as dependent 
variable for the VLSM. This computation is important because it allows correcting the error 
rate for the total amount of errors and it highlights possible categorical differences in the 
error production. Additionally, we have run the same analysis using the average between 
anomia and good circumlocutions scores, in order to find areas associated with word-finding 
problems. 
 Since the patients performed at ceiling level on the word-to-picture matching and 
picture sorting tasks, we did not perform the VLSM analyses on the scores on those tasks. 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Neuropsychological assessment 
The univariate ANOVAs on the neuropsychological tests (Table 2) revealed significant 
main effects of side for the Token test (F(1,30) = 6.43, p < .05), Verbal Fluency (F(1,30) = 4.84, 
p < .05), Digit Span forward (F(1,30) = 8.00, p < .01), Digit Span backward (F(1,30) = 5.25, p < 
.05) and Memory of Prose (F(1,28) = 26.09, p < .000), and significant main effects of site for 
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Verbal Fluency (F(1,30) = 4.53, p < .05), Rey figure immediate copy (F(1,29) = 5.22, p < .05), 
Digit Span backward (F(1,30) = 10.83, p < .005), and Corsi spatial span (F(1,30) = 7.35, p = 
.001), but no significant interactions between side and site. More specifically LBD patients 
performed worse than RBD patients on the Token test, Verbal fluency, Memory of Prose, Digit 
Span Forward and Backwards. Moreover, patients with lesions in the frontal lobes were 
worse than those with lesions within the temporal lobes on the Rey figure immediate copy, 
Digit span backwards and Corsi’s spatial span, whereas lesions within the temporal lobes gave 
rise to lower performance on Verbal fluency task, than frontal lesions. 
 
Figure 3 
 
Note: Mean accuracy (Z-scores) on Picture Naming task for each side (Left, Right) (panel a) and site 
(Frontal, Temporal) (panel b) divided by category (living things, non-living things, social groups).  * p 
< .05, ** p < .005    
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2.3.2 Picture naming task  
The repeated measure ANOVA on naming raw scores showed significant main effects 
of category (F(1.3,40) = 46.37, p < .001), side (F(1,31) = 5.46, p < .05), and a significant 
interaction of category x Side (F(1.3) = 4.35, p < .05). To better understand the category x side 
interaction, pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni corrections were carried out and revealed 
that LBD patients performed significantly worse than RBD patients on non-living things (p < 
.05) and social groups (p < .05), but not on living things (p =  .13) (see Figure 3a). Moreover 
both LBD and RBD were more impaired in naming social groups than living things (LBD: p < 
.001; RBD: p < .05) and non-living things (LBD: p < .001; RBD p < .05)), while no difference 
between living and non-living things occurred (LBD and RBD: p > .05). LBD patients 
performed significantly more poorly than healthy controls on all the categories of stimuli 
(living things: t(19.7) = 2.29, p < .05; non-living things: t(19.15) =-2.63, p < .05; social groups: 
t(22.24) = -3.54, p < .01), whereas RBD patients did not perform differently from healthy 
controls (all ps > .05). Both patients’ and controls’ naming scores as a function of the category 
are reported in the Table 6. 
Although the category x site interaction was not significant, for exploratory sake, the 
participants’ raw accuracy score was compared with healthy controls’ as a function of 
category and site (see Figure 3b). These analyses revealed that frontal tumor patients’ scores 
were significantly lower than those of healthy controls only in naming social groups 
(t(18.28)= -2.33, p < .05), (living non-living things were not significant: ps > .05) whereas 
temporal tumor patients’ performance was worse than that of healthy controls on all the 
categories (living things: t(18.46)= 2.15, p < .05; non-living things: t(17.3) = 2.64, p < .05; 
social groups: t(21.87) = 2.24, p < .05). The same ANOVA as above was carried out using the 
tumor type as independent factor. Results showed that the tumor type did not interact with 
any other factors (i.e., side, p = .31, site, p = .54, category, p = .20), neither did it moderate the 
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first order or the second order interactions (p = .19). The type of tumor did not show a 
significant main effect (p = .23), Hence, the variable can be discarded from the analyses. 
 
Table 6: Picture naming: raw data. 
Side Site 
Living Non-Living Social 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Controls Controls 14.76 0.44 14.96 0.20 13.32 1.22 
Right 
Frontal 14.71 0.49 15.00 0.00 12.86 0.90 
Temporal 14.25 0.71 14.88 0.35 13.25 1.75 
Total 14.47 0.64 14.93 0.26 13.07 1.39 
Left 
Frontal 13.10 3.38 13.30 3.77 9.90 4.56 
Temporal 13.50 2.32 13.20 1.87 10.60 2.88 
Total 13.30 2.83 13.25 2.90 10.25 3.73 
Note. Mean and Standard Deviations of patients’ raw accuracy scores as a function of side (right vs. 
left), site (frontal vs. temporal) and category (living, non-living, and social). 
 
2.3.2.1 Picture naming task: correlation analyses  
The results of the correlation analyses are summarized in Table 7 for RBD and in Table 
8 for LBD. RBD patients’ naming social groups and living things positively correlated only 
with performance on an attentional task (Star Cancellation), whereas naming non-living 
things did not correlate with any neuropsychological test. LBD patients’ overall naming (all 
categories) positively correlated with language comprehension (Token test), and executive 
functions (verbal fluency). More specifically, LBD patients’ naming social groups correlated 
with another executive test (FAB), with an attentional test (Star Cancellation) and tasks 
tapping visuo-spatial short-term memory (Corsi’s spatial span), naming living things 
positively correlated with short-term memory (Digit Span Forward), while naming non-living 
things correlated with performance on tasks tapping long-term memory (memory of prose). 
Moreover naming both non-living things and social groups positively correlated with 
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performance on an attentional task (Visual Search). Importantly naming social groups did not 
correlate with facial recognition (Benton’s test) 
The analysis of the correlations’ magnitude between LBD and RBD patients (see Table 
9) revealed that correlations between a comprehension task (Token test) and the naming task 
were significantly higher in LBD than in RBD patients for each category. The same pattern of 
results was obtained when correlations between long-term memory (memory of prose) and 
non-living things, and working memory (Digit Span Backwards) and social groups were 
performed. Importantly there was no difference between LBD and RBD patients when 
correlations of executive functions (Verbal Fluency, FAB) with face recognition (Benton’s 
test). 
2.3.2.2. Picture naming task: error analyses 
LT made significantly more good circumlocutions than LF patients in naming social 
groups (ps < .05), and more anomias than RF patients (p = .05) in naming both social groups 
and living things (see Table 10). 
2.3.3 Word-to-picture matching task and picture sorting tasks 
The results of the other two experimental tasks (word-to picture matching and picture 
sorting) were not analysed, as participants performed at ceiling level (word-to-picture 
matching task - mean accuracy > 98.5%; sorting task – mean accuracy > 98.5) and healthy 
control groups (word-to-picture matching – mean accuracy > 99.5%; picture sorting task – 
mean accuracy: all categories = 100%). 
2.3.4 Level of specificity 
Results showed that healthy controls named the items belonging to living and non-
living things at the same level of specificity (p = .69), while social groups were named at a 
lower level of specificity than the other two categories (ps < .000).  
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Table 7: Correlations between picture naming accuracy and performance on neuropsychological tests of RBD. 
 Category Token Fluency FAB Rey-fig copy Benton Vis Search Star Span-f Span-b Corsi Prose Rey-fig delayed 
Living things -0.09 0.25 0.38 -0.03 0.24 -0.01 0.57* -0.16 -0.14 -0.01 -0.30 0.18 
Non-living things 0.03 0.17 0.43 0.25 0.35 -0.06 0.37 -0.06 -0.20 -0.06 -0.34 0.06 
Social groups 0.05 0.50 0.17 -0.13 0.36 0.28 0.68** 0.07 -0.25 0.25 -0.11 -0.20 
Note. Spearman's rho correlations of RBD patients between the raw accuracy scores on each category of the picture naming task and 
neuropsychological tests. * =  p < .05        ** = p < .005       *** = p < .001. 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Correlations between picture naming accuracy and performance on neuropsychological tests of LBD. 
 Category Token Fluency FAB Rey-fig copy Benton Vis Search Star Span-f Span-b Corsi Prose Rey-fig delayed 
Living things 0.70** 0.63** 0.25 0.43 -0.11 0.40 -0.03 0.47* 0.33 0.31 -0.12 0.17 
Non-living things 0.86** 0.58** 0.35 0.23 -0.33 0.55* 0.19 0.55* 0.24 0.17 0.62** 0.07 
Social groups 0.69** 0.73** 0.65** 0.22 -0.17 0.49* 0.15 0.41 0.33 0.46* 0.46 0.13 
Note. Spearman's rho correlations of LBD patients between the raw accuracy scores on each category of the picture naming task and 
neuropsychological tests. * =  p < .05        ** = p < .005       *** = p < .001. 
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Table 9: Magnitude of correlations between LBD and RBD performance on naming and neuropsychological tests. 
Category Token Fluency FAB 
Rey-fig 
copy Benton 
Vis 
Search Star Span-f Span-b Corsi Prose 
Rey-fig 
delayed 
Living things -2.55* -1.23 0.38 -1.28 0.86 -1.17 1.81 -1.77 -1.29 -0.88 -0.5 0.04 
Non-living things -3.36*** -1.24 0.27 0.06 1.77 -1.82 0.53 -1.79 -1.19 -1.4 -2.76** -0.01 
Social groups -2.09* -0.96 -1.54 -0.92 1.39 -0.66 1.82 -0.97 -2.01* -0.65 -1.54 -0.83 
Note. Fisher’s z-transformation. * =  p < .05                   ** = p < .005       *** = p < .001. 
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Table 10: Picture naming: error types. 
 Group Poor circ Good circ Anomia Semantic par Phonemic par Verbal par Visual error Visual-semantic 
  L NL S L NL S L NL S L NL S L NL S L NL S L NL S L NL S 
 LF 0 0 4 0 0 8 6 9 15 0 1 3 3 3 3 6 2 8 2 0 5 1 0 1 
 LT 0 3 6 0 4 19 4 3 7 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
 RF 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 2 
 RT 0 0 3 0 0 4 1 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 2 
Note. Total amount of errors made by each patient subgroup, divided by type of error (Poor circ = poor circumlocutions, Good circ = good 
circumlocutions, Semantic par = semantic paraphasia, Phonemic par = phonemic paraphasia, Verbal par = verbal paraphasia, Visual-
semantic = visual semantic error) and category (L = living things, NL = non-living things, S= social groups).  
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2.3.5 Lesion Analysis 
2.3.5.1 Picture Naming 
The VLSM analyses on picture naming task revealed a set of areas whose selective 
damage was associated with social group naming impairments, while no area was selectively 
associated with the remaining categories (see Table 11 and Figure 4). Specifically the analyses 
showed significant clusters within the left hemisphere involving the putamen, and minor 
cluster including insula, pallidum and inferior temporal lobe.   
 
Table 11: Areas resulting from the VLSM analyses on naming social groups. 
AAL label N of voxels % of total Max Z-score Max X Max Y Max Z 
Putamen 172 2.17 3.48 -28 -10 1 
Insula 29 0.19 3.89 -27 30 12 
Pallidum 28 1.23 3.48 -27 -10 1 
Inferior temporal gyrus 12 0.05 3.39 -39 -26 -23 
Fusiform gyrus 10 0.05 3.39 -37 -26 -23 
Middle frontal gyrus 8 0.02 3.29 -32 34 15 
Caudate 6 0.08 3.29 -19 22 16 
Subcortical 638 0.01 3.89 -25 30 12 
Note. All the areas are located in the left hemisphere. AAL = automated anatomical labeling 
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Figure 4 
 
Note: VLSM analysis on picture naming accuracy. Areas significantly associated to social 
groups naming deficits (p < .05) 
 
2.3.5.2 Error Analyses 
The second VLSM on picture naming errors (Figure 5) revealed that patients with 
higher rates of good circumlocutions with the social groups had lesions located within the left 
insula, inferior frontal gyrus, frontal operculum, superior temporal pole and basal ganglia 
(putamen, caudate and pallidum) and amygdala (see Table 12 for details). Moreover the same 
analysis on word-finding errors (performed considering anomia and good circumlocution as 
the same error) revealed the same areas. No particular area reached the threshold when 
errors in naming living and non-living things were considered. 
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Table 12: Areas resulting from the VLSM analyses on picture naming errors for the 
social group category. 
AAL label N of voxels % of total Max Z-score Max X Max Y Max Z 
Insula 6928 46.11 3.89 -28 30 12 
Putamen 4832 60.84 3.89 -28 -10 1 
Inferior frontal gyrus,    
pars triangularis 
3867 19.23 3.89 -32 35 12 
Inferior frontal gyrus,  
pars opercularis 
3066 37.07 3.43 -50 5 6 
Inferior frontal gyrus,  
pars orbitalis 
943 6.94 3.43 -42 17 -12 
Rolandic operculum 875 11.02 3.43 -51 4 4 
Caudate 505 6.57 3.29 -17 17 5 
Precentral 260 0.92 3.29 -51 7 15 
Superior temporal 
pole 
216 2.11 3.62 -32 4 -20 
Pallidum 215 9.41 3.89 -27 -10 1 
Amygdala 118 6.81 3.62 -31 0 -19 
Middle frontal gyrus 23 0.06 3.89 -32 34 15 
Subcortical 7114 0.13 3.89 -31 32 12 
Note. All the areas are located in the left hemisphere. AAL = automated anatomical labelling 
 
 
Figure 5 
 
Note: VLSM analysis on good circumlocutions. Areas significantly associated to a higher 
amount of good circumlocutions for the social group category (p < .05) 
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2.4 Discussion 
In the present study, we tested whether in patients with brain tumors the lexical-
semantic knowledge about social groups and the knowledge about other categories such as 
living and non-living things are independently represented in the brain, and whether they can 
result as being differentially impaired, depending on the specific site of the lesion. 
The first main result is that the patients performed pathologically only on the picture 
naming task, while their performance on the word-to-picture-matching and picture sorting 
showed no sign of being affected by brain damage. Moreover, there was an effect of side of the 
lesion on picture naming, with left-brain damaged patients (both temporal and frontal) being 
more impaired than both right-brain damaged patients and healthy controls, while no 
difference was observed between the latter two groups. To explain this pattern of results it is 
necessary to consider two aspects: the aetiology of patients’ lesions (HGG, LGG, meningioma, 
and metastasis) and the focal nature of such lesions. Fast growing tumors (HGG, metastasis) 
may give rise to more severe deficits than slow growing lesions (LGG, meningiomas), since the 
latter tend to recruit ipsi- and contralateral areas more efficiently than the former (Desmurget 
et al., 2007). On the other hand, LGG patients’ deficits, although milder than HGG patients’, are 
more pronounced immediately after surgical resection (Campanella et al., 2015), and some 
specific lesion locations tend to compensate minimally (Ius et al., 2011). Moreover, previous 
studies testing semantic memory in patients with unilateral lesions (Campanella et al.,2010, 
Lambon Ralph et al., 2010; 2012) or bilateral lesions but more pronounced within one 
hemisphere (Lambon Ralph et al., 2001), reported prominent verbal output deficits and mild 
or normal receptive performance. In a computation model proposed to account for this 
phenomenon (Lambon Ralph et al., 2001), semantic knowledge is hypothesised to rely on a 
bilateral, distributed semantic system, with the left hemisphere semantic areas having 
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privileged connections to the left-lateralized phonology. Hence, the left-sided damage of the 
semantic store is predicted to lead to a deficit in production sparing comprehension.  
Second, VLSM analyses on picture naming accuracy revealed that lesions of specific 
areas were associated to deficits in naming social groups while no specific area reached the 
threshold for living and non-living things. Specifically, social group naming impairment was 
associated with the lesion of left putamen and a minor cluster within left insula. Left putamen 
has been found to be highly activated during picture naming (Kiyosawa et al., 1996) and has 
been suggested to be involved in computing both syntactic and lexical processes (Teichmann 
et al., 2008). Importantly, since putamen was not associated with patients’ performance on 
other categories, this result cannot be ascribed to a general language disorder. 
Since the patients’ naming impairment could occur at different processing levels 
(Kreisler et al., 2000), we also performed a VLSM analysis on the different error types made 
by the patients, discarding effects due to general language impairments. The types of error 
made in naming can help us to identify the level at which the lexical-semantic processing 
breaks down, while correlating the main error types with the brain lesions pinpoints the sub-
regions responsible for the emergence of those particular errors. The rate of word-finding 
errors (anomia and circumlocutions) with the social groups was significantly associated with 
lesions involving left insula, left inferior frontal gyrus, left amygdala and left basal ganglia 
(putamen, caudate, pallidum), while no error was associated with specific areas for the living 
and non-living things. Verbal production impairments (especially word-finding impairments) 
without associated receptive deficits have been typically observed in patients with left sided 
unilateral temporal damage. In the present study the involvement of ATL was only marginal: 
indeed we found a more prominent involvement of left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), left insula, 
left amygdala and basal ganglia. Left IFG damage tends to lead to non-fluent aphasia 
(Damasio, 1992), which in turn is associated with a higher rate of anomia, while in fMRI 
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studies it has been found to be implicated in the selection among semantic information and in 
recollecting information from long-term memory (Thompson-Schill et al., 1997; Moss et al., 
2005). In our study, as the errors selectively involved the social stimuli, we cannot explain the 
results as being due to a general language impairment.  
Many of the areas (amygdala, insula and striatum) associated with higher rate of word-
finding errors with social groups have often been found implicated in emotional processing. 
Indeed, amygdala has been associated with social evaluation and perception (Adolphs, 2009), 
its activation has been found to be modulated by racial stereotype (Phelps et al., 2000, 
Cunningham et al., 2004) and its lesion seems to lead to the impairment in perceiving facial 
expressions of fear (Adolphs et al., 1994). Insula seems to be involved in interoception, in 
processing stimuli with emotional content, and in empathy (Singer et al., 2009). A recent 
review (Bickart et al., 2014) on converging evidence from studies involving animals (rodents 
and monkeys) and humans (both healthy and patients), showed that insula, amygdala and 
striatum are part of a network processing aversive stimuli. Interestingly the same set of areas 
(insula, amygdala and putamen) and left inferior frontal gyrus have been associated to 
implicit emotion processing (Critchley et al., 2000). Finally, left inferior frontal gyrus was 
found to be activated in studies contrasting social vs. animal concepts (Zahn et al., 2007) and 
person vs. object knowledge (Contreras et al., 2011), and might play a role in processing 
conspecifics. It is plausible that social knowledge includes also an evaluative component (also 
referred in literature as prejudice), in addition to a classical semantic component (see, 
Carnaghi et al., 2015).  Indeed social groups (i.e., immigrants) might be intrinsically defined by 
attributes with high emotional content (i.e., dangerous, dirty, untrustworthy), and the lesion 
of emotion processing areas could impoverish their representation.  
The selective impairment in naming non-living things, with spared knowledge about 
living things has previously been observed in brain tumor patients with lesions located within 
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the left temporal lobe (Campanella et al., 2010). In the current study, patients’ performance 
was predicted by AoA and the VLSM showed no specific area associated with non-living 
naming impairment. Importantly, patients’ naming performance cannot be explained by social 
groups and living things differing in familiarity, as they were rated alike in our pilot study. On 
the other hand, even though the AoA significantly explained the 37% of variance in patients’ 
performance, when splitting the items according to category, we found that it significantly 
explained only the performance on non-living items (48% of variance explained). Moreover, 
since naming social groups did not correlate neither with AoA nor with familiarity, one can 
hypothesize that, in addition to lexical-semantic knowledge, affective/evaluative processes 
might contribute to naming (Barsalou et al., 2003). 
Moreover, relative to naming other categories, social group naming is unlikely to have 
been influenced by higher level of specificity of the stimuli and, consequently, by higher 
demand on cognitive abilities. However the level of specificity was not constant across 
categories, being the social groups named at a more superordinate level than living and non-
living things. 
In our study, the ATL is only marginally associated with patients’ performance on 
social groups; thus, neither the social knowledge hypothesis, which highlights the importance 
of ATL in social knowledge representation, neither the Thompson et al.’s (2004) position, 
whereby person knowledge is represented within the right ATL, seem to explain our results. 
In conclusion, our results indicate that the lexical-semantic knowledge about social 
groups may be independent of living and non-living things, consistently with previous 
neuropsychological (Rumiati et al., 2014) and neuroimaging studies (Contreras et al., 2011). 
We suggest that the knowledge about conspecifics differs from the other types of knowledge, 
since it includes also an affective component, as suggested by the association of the naming 
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deficits with amygdala, insula and putamen lesions and the higher rates of word-finding 
errors.  
The extent to which social group knowledge is independent of other categories and 
whether the nature of social group attributes might influence categorization should need 
further investigation.  In the next chapter I will report a study investigating social group 
knowledge in patients with primary dementia that aimed at addressing these questions.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Is social group representation explained by the 
sensory/functional theory? 
 
Abstract 
Recent findings revealed that social group representation might be independent of the 
other categories of knowledge (e.g., living and non-living entities), and that might be 
associated to emotion-processing areas. Current models on semantic knowledge proposed 
that concepts might be represented according to the modality of their attributes 
(Sensory/Functional Theory (SFT), Conceptual-Topography Theory (CTT)) or segregated into 
independent domains shaped by evolution (DSH). In order to better characterize social group 
representation, we tested patients with primary dementia on their knowledge about social 
groups as well as living (natural things) and non-living (artificial things) things. Moreover, 
social groups could belong to one of two different sub-categories, defined one by sensory 
features (natural groups), such as the ethnic groups, the other by functional features, such as 
professions. The results on voxel-based morphometry showed that both social group 
categories were associated with emotion-processing areas, natural groups and natural things 
were associated with inferior temporal areas and artificial things and groups were associated 
with motor- processing areas (DLPFC). Taken together, our results showed a tight association 
between category-specific semantic deficits and unimodal-processing areas, and are more 
easily explained by the SFT or the CTT. 
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3.1 Introduction  
Double dissociations in neurological and neurosurgical patients (for review see 
Capitani et al., 2003) between the ability to process different categories, such as animals, 
plants, artifacts and conspecifics greatly helped in explaining how semantic knowledge might 
be represented in the brain. To account for these observations, three main groups of theories 
were formulated. According to a first group of theories, our semantic system stores each 
concept in modality-specific semantic areas (SFT, Warrington & Shallice, 1984; hub-and-
spokes theory, Patterson et al., 2007) or in low level perceptual cortices (CTT, Simmons & 
Barsalou, 2003) depending on the attributes defining each concept. Thus, if on the one hand, 
the concept of a “dog” might be defined by its perceptual features as its physical aspect or its 
bark, on the other, a “hammer” might be defined by its function, as it is useful to hit a nail. It 
follows that damage to a perceptual- or motor-related areas will lead to a specific deficit, in 
recognizing animate or inanimate entities knowledge, respectively. It is worth noting that, 
while some theories (i.e., SFT, hub-and-spokes theory) highlight the need for recoding 
perceptual representations into abstract and symbolic formats (and hence the need for an 
amodal symbolic semantic system which interface with perceptual areas) in order to achieve 
conceptual representations, others (i.e., CTT) proposed that perceptual areas and the re-
enactment of previous experience is sufficient for allowing semantic cognition. 
A second group of theories (e.g., Tyler and Moss. 2001) holds that the inter-correlation 
and the degree of distinctiveness of concept features would shape the categorization in the 
brain: since animate entities tend to share many inter-correlated features and a few 
distinctive features, while artifacts tend to share many distinctive features, strongly 
correlated with their perceptual features and a few inter-correlated features. These theories 
highlighted the importance of the task and of the level of specificity of the stimuli used in the 
emergence of semantic deficits in patients. Hence damage to areas processing more general 
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inter-correlated features are expected to impair recognition of animate entities, while damage 
to areas processing more distinctive features are expected to impair recognition of artefacts. 
The third group of theories (DSH, Mahon and Caramazza, 2009; 2011) proposed that 
evolution has shaped our conceptual system into distinct domains, which are thought to be 
relevant for human survival: animals, plants, artifacts and conspecifics. The type of process 
performed within a certain region, as well as its pattern of connection with other regions has 
induced the development of specialized, category-specific networks through evolutionary 
pressure. 
One type of knowledge that has received little attention is that about conspecifics; this 
has been investigated at a very general level of specificity, in contrast with the unique entity 
level which has been extensively studied (see Blank et al., 2011 for review), in both in 
neuropsychological (Zahn et al., 2009; Rumiati et al., 2014; Piretti et al.. 2015) and 
neuroimaging (Contreras et al., 2012; Zahn et al.. 2007, Chedid et al., 2016) studies. Rumiati et 
al. (2014) found that patients with primary dementia could be either selectively impaired in 
sorting social group nouns, while being still able to sort animate and inanimate items – but 
also other patients showing the opposite pattern of behaviour. These double dissociations led 
to suggest that conspecifics might be represented in the brain independently of the other 
categories. Both neuroimaging and neuropsychological findings converge on the evidence of 
associating ATLs with famous and familiar person knowledge (Gainotti, 2007; Blank et al., 
2011), with social concepts (Zahn et al., 2007, 2009) and social groups (Chedid, 2016; Piretti 
et al., 2015) and led some authors to suggest that ATLs might play a role in representing social 
knowledge (social knowledge hypothesis, Ross and Olson, 2010; Skipper et al., 2011). Aside 
the ATL, a set of areas - frequently associated with emotional processing - insula, the 
opercular part of IFG, amygdala, medial prefrontal cortex, ACC and orbitofrontal cortex - have 
been also found (Zahn et al., 2007; Chedid et al., 2016, Skipper et al., 2011).    
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The importance of emotional processing is not new in the social group cognitive 
research field, and especially in the study of inter-group relations. Indeed the race bias is 
thought to include both stereotypes, which are representations of culturally held beliefs about 
social groups members, (or the knowledge about social groups, including personal traits or 
circumstantial attributes) (Hamilton, 1981) and prejudice, which is the affective response 
toward social group members (typically negative toward out-groups) (McConahay and 
Hough, 1976), reflecting, respectively, cognitive and affective aspects. It has been proposed 
that these two aspects might rely on different brain networks, with stereotypes more 
associated to anterior temporal cortices, IFG and medial PFC and prejudice more associated to 
amygdala, insula, striatum and orbital frontal cortex (for review, see Amodio, 2014). 
Together these findings converging on both DSH and social knowledge hypothesis, but 
might also reflect the affective nature of social features, and hence confirming the assumption 
that modality-processing areas are involved in conceptual representation as proposed by the 
SFT or the CTT.  
In order to disentangle the role of modality-specific processing we tested patients with 
primary dementia and healthy controls on semantic knowledge about animals, artifacts and 
social groups, and modulating the latter category along the sensory-functional dimension. 
Specifically, social groups as stimuli were characterized by either perceptual features (natural 
groups) (e.g. ethnic groups. social groups defined by physical appearance) or by functional 
features (artificial groups) (e.g. professions). If modality-specific information is relevant for 
representing social groups, patients with atrophy involving motor areas and visual areas 
would be impaired in the knowledge about artificial and natural groups, respectively. 
Conversely, if modality-specific processing is not necessary for social group representation, 
the atrophy of those areas should not affect semantic knowledge. Moreover if the distinction 
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between stereotype and prejudice is genuine, the deficit on social group knowledge should be 
associated to the atrophy of the stereotype network (ATLs, IFG, medial PFC) 
3.2 Materials and methods 
3.2.1 Participants 
The study includes patients with a diagnosis of dementia (N = 26) recruited from the 
neurology wards of “Santa Maria della Misericordia” hospital (Udine, Italy) or from “Ospedali 
Riuniti di Trieste” (Trieste, Italy). The study also included 19 healthy controls (Ctrls). 
Inclusion criteria for healthy controls were the absence of any neurological, psychiatric or 
neurosurgical condition, to be Italian native-language speakers and to obtain at least an 
uncorrected score of 28 at the MMSE.  Patients’ group included 10 patients with the 
behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) (Raskovsky et al., 2007; 2011), 10 
patients with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) (McKahn et al., 2011) and 6 patients with primary 
progressive aphasia (PPA) (Gorno-Tempini et al., 2011), diagnosed according to the 
international criteria. PPA group comprises three patients with semantic dementia (SD), one 
patient with non-fluent progressive aphasia (NFPA) and two patients with logopenic 
progressive aphasia (LPA). Participant groups differed significantly for education, but not for 
age. Specifically, AD patients had significantly more years of education than Ctrls (p < .01) 
(See Table 13). 
All participants were tested on neuropsychological and experimental tasks and 
underwent a MRI scanning session. The experiment was approved by independent regional 
ethic committee and participants signed an informed consent before taking part to the 
experiment. 
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Table 13 
Group Age (SD) Education (SD) N (F) 
Ctrls 69.9 (5.3) 13.0 (4.5) 19 (13) 
bvFTD 71.7 (5.4) 10.3 (4.5) 10 (6) 
AD 75.1 (7.1) 7.5 (3.2) 10 (8) 
PPA 71.5 (6.8) 9.8 (6.4) 6 (2) 
Note: The table shows age, years of education, sample size and number of female (F), for each of the four groups 
of participants 
 
3.2.2 Stimuli 
All stimuli used in the study proper belonged to four categories: natural things (i.e. 
animals), artifical things (i.e., artifacts), natural groups (i.e., social groups defined by their 
sensory features; e.g., obese people, Africans-Americans) and artifical groups (i.e., 
professions). The selection of the stimuli was performed through four successive steps: rating 
of a large set of words, selection of 8 words for each category, rating of a large set of 
photographs depicting the words selected, selection of three photographs for each word. 
First, a total set of 167 words, including animals, artificial objects and social groups 
(i.e., Chinese people, doctors, obese people), were rated by 14 healthy Italian-native speaking 
healthy participants on three different dimensions (positive and negative attitude of the 
society towards the items and frequency of exposition to the items) on a scale from 1 to 7. 
Positive and negative society attitudes were used, instead of an explicit measure of the 
valence, in order to avoid possible effects due to social conformity. A valence index was then 
computed subtracting the negative to the positive attitude. Familiarity ratings were averaged 
into a single frequency index.  
We selected 8 words for each category and stimuli belonging to all categories were 
matched for letter length, valence and familiarity (it was not possible to match natural and 
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artificial groups according to valence, since professions were globally high in valence, while 
natural groups were associated to low valence ratings).  
In the next step, for each item we selected ten different coloured photographs 
(640x480 pixels) and asked 12 different healthy participants to name and rate all 
photographs for the ambiguity, typicality and valence (scale 1-9).  Then, we selected three 
photographs for each item (among those which were named more accurately and with the 
least ambiguity) matching each category of pictures for ambiguity, valence and typicality. 
Hence we selected three different exemplars for each of the 8 items of the four categories. The 
same set of pictures was used in both the picture naming and the word-to-picture matching 
tasks. 
To make sure that the items selected were truly modulated by the nature of their 
attributes (sensory, functional), in two different ratings further 24 participants rated how 
much each item was defined by sensory (i.e., How much ‘lawyers’ can be defined by their 
physical appearance?) or functional (i.e., How much ‘lawyers’ can be defined by their 
function?) features. A ratio between sensory and functional attributes for each semantic 
category was obtained by dividing the average sensory scores by the average functional 
scores (SF-ratio). A repeated-measure analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on the SF 
ratios, with humankind (things, groups) and naturality (natural, artificial) as within-
participant factors. The ANOVA showed a significant main effect of naturality (F(1, 23) = 
11.98, p = .002) with SF-ratio being higher for natural than for artificial stimuli (Figure 6). 
One-sample t-tests versus 1 showed that the SF-ratio was above 1 for natural things and 
natural groups (t > 2.6), but below 1 for artificial groups (t(23) = -3.81, p = .001), and equal to 
1 for artificial things (t(23) = -1.31, p = .21). Neither the main effect of humankind (F(1, 23) = 
.68, p = .4), nor the humankind x naturality interaction (F(1. 23) = .07, p = .79) were 
significant.  
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Figure  6 
 
Note: The graph shows the SF Ratio across the four different conditions. * indicates p < .05 for the one-sample t-
test versus 1. 
 
3.2.3 Neuropsychological assessment 
All participants’ global cognitive functions were assessed using the Addenbrooke’s 
Cognitive Examination – revised (ACE-R) (Pigliautile et al., 2012). This test provides two 
global indexes (ACE-R and MMSE) and five subscales for different cognitive domains: 
attention and orientation (ACEao), memory (ACEm), language (ACEl), fluency (ACEf) and 
visuo-spatial abilities (ACEvs). They were also tested on executive functions through the 
Frontal Assessment Battery (FAB) (Apollonio, 2005). Two patients (one from the bvFTD and 
the other from AD group) and one participant from the Ctrls were not tested using the FAB. 
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3.2.4 Experimental tasks 
Participants were asked to perform two tasks, tapping the semantic system: a picture 
naming task and a word-to-picture matching task. Both tasks were presented on a 17-inches 
laptop using E-prime 2.0 (www.pstnet.com). Each participant performed first the picture 
naming task, in which they had to provide a name for each photograph at a time, providing a 
single word, and then the word-to-picture matching task (except for one patient with LPA 
who did want to perform the word-to-picture matching task). In the latter task, they were 
asked to associate the name of each item (e.g. Chinese people) presented auditorily, through 
computer headphones, to one of the four pictures (all of the same category) presented on the 
computer screen. Using this set of tasks we were able to evaluate both receptive and 
productive semantic abilities.  
To obtain a more reliable measure of the lexical/semantic abilities of our participants, 
we recoded patients’ accuracy scores in both picture naming and word-to-picture matching 
into consistency scores (range: 0-8). Consistency scores were calculated considering one 
point if the participant responded correctly at least in one on three trials for each item and 
zero points if the participant could not name any of the trials for each item. This consistency 
index is useful for two reasons: i) the score is less biased by visual/perceptual errors, since 
each item is presented with three different exemplars, and ii) it sheds light on the 
lexical/semantic storage degradation. It has been proposed that semantic memory 
impairments might be associated with two distinct patterns of deficits: the degradation of the 
semantic storage or semantic access impairment. Warrington and Shallice (1979) described 
four main criteria to distinguish between the two conditions: consistency of the responses for 
each item, the effect of word frequency, susceptibility to cueing from a semantically related 
word and depth of processing (the type of word produced in case the right word is not 
retrieved).  
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3.2.5 Neuroimaging acquisition 
Each participant T1-weighted MRI was acquired using a Philips Achieva 3.0 T MRI 
scanner at the hospital “Santa Maria della Misericordia” in Udine, Italy. Imaging parameters 
for structural T1-weighted images were: 170 slices, voxel size (mm) = 1.0 x1.0 x 1.0. TR/TE = 
8.1/3.7, flip angle = 12°, slice orientation = sagittal, scan duration = 7.59 mins.  
3.2.6 Statistical analyses 
3.2.6.1 Behavioural analyses 
All the behavioural analyses were conducted using SPSS (version 21.0.0.0) 
(http://www.ibm.com/analytics/us/en/technology/spss). 
Neuropsychological assessment scores on MMSE, FAB, ACER_tot and its subscales were 
analysed using a series of One-way ANOVAs, with the group (Ctrls, bvFTD, AD, PPA) between-
subject factor. Post-hoc analyses were performed using Bonferroni correction. The same 
analysis was performed on the total accuracy scores on picture naming and word-to picture 
matching tasks, in order to highlight differences in the global patients’ performance. 
Moreover, to show possible pattern of categorical deficits in our sample of participant we 
performed two repeated-measure ANOVAs on both picture naming and word-to-picture 
matching tasks, using Humankind (non-human, human) and Naturality (Natural, Artificial) as 
within-subject factors, and Group (Ctrls, bvFTD, AD, PPA) as between-subject factor. Pairwise 
comparisons were corrected for Bonferroni. 
3.2.6.2 Voxel-based morphometry  
Participants’ structural T1 images and fMRI scans were pre-processed using spm12 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm12/), a software running on Matlab 
(versions R2012b) (www.mathworks.com). Each T1-weighted image was segmented into 
grey matter, white matter and CSF images. Then a study-specific template was created using 
the Diffeomorphic Anatomical Registration Through Exponentiated Lie algebra (DARTEL) 
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(Ashburner. 2007), implemented in spm12, using as inputs the scans of the entire sample of 
participants. All participants’ grey matter DARTEL templates were then affine registered to 
tissue probability maps in MNI space. For each participant, a non-linear warping of grey 
matter DARTEL image to MNI space was created, and then used to modulate the 
normalization of grey matter images. Following this procedure, the final images had a voxel 
size of 1.5x1.5x1.5 mm and were smoothed using a 8mm Gaussian kernel. 
VBMs (Ashburner and Friston, 2000), were performed using a general linear model 
(multiple regression), putting as factors the consistency scores of the picture naming task of 
each of the category investigated and as covariates of no interest age, education and sex. We 
also used a proportional global normalization, using the total intracranial volume for each 
subject. To increase the power of the analysis and to highlight the neural substrates 
associated to poor performances on natural and artificial categories, and on social and non-
social categories, we performed other two analyses on Naturality, using as factors the sum of 
the consistency scores natural (things and groups) items and of artificial (things and groups) 
items and on Humankind, using as factors the sum of the consistency scores on non-human 
items (natural and artificial things) and the ones on human items (natural and artificial 
groups). The consistency scores on word-to-picture naming task was not analysed because 
participants performed almost at ceiling. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Neuropsychological assessment 
One-way ANOVAs on score of the neuropsychological assessment battery revealed 
significant effects of MMSE (F(3, 41) = 15.65, p <.001), ACEtot (F(3, 41) = 36.18, p < .001), 
ACEao (F(3, 41) = 11.79, p < .001), ACEm (F(3, 41) = 24.36, p < .001), ACEf (F(3, 41) = 28.55, p 
< .001), ACEl (F(3, 41) = 23.61, p < .001), ACEvs (F(3, 41) = 8.90, p < .001) and FAB (F(3, 41) = 
15.61, p < .001). Pairwise comparisons (see Table 14) showed that Ctrls performed 
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significantly better than all the other groups on global cognitive functions (ACEtot) (all ps <. 
001), memory (ACEm) (bvFTD p < .01; AD p < .001; PPA p < .001) and executive functions 
(ACEf, FAB) (all ps <. 001), while they performed better than AD and PPA patients on 
attention and orientation (ACEao) (Ctrls vs AD: p < .01; Ctrls vs. PPA: p < .001), linguistic 
abilities (ACEl) (Ctrls vs AD: p < .01; Ctrls vs. PPA: p < .001) and the MMSE (all ps < .001). 
bvFTD patients showed a better performance than PPA patients on global cognition (ACEtot p 
< .001;  MMSE p < .01), attention and orientation (ACEao) (p < .01), fluency(ACEf) (p < . 01) 
and linguistic abilities (ACEl) (p < .001), and a better performance on memory (ACEm) (p < 
.05) than AD patients. PPA patients’ scores were also lower than all the other groups on visuo-
spatial abilities (ACEvs) (Ctrl vs PPA: p < .001; bvFTDvs PPA: p < .05; AD vs PPA: p < .001), 
language (ACEl) (all ps < .001) and ACEtot (AD vs PPA p < .05). 
 
Table 14 
Group 
MMSE 
(0-30) 
ACE_tot 
(0-100) 
ACE_ao 
(0-18) 
ACE_m 
(0-26) 
ACE_f 
(0-14) 
ACE_l 
(0-26) 
ACE_vs 
(0-16) 
FAB 
(0-18) 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Ctrls 29.5 0.6 94.3 4.7 17.9 0.2 23.3 2.8 11.4 2.4 25.7 0.5 16.0 0.0 16.4 1.7 
bvFTD 26.3 2.9 76.0 8.2 15.8 2.4 15.8 6.0 6.8 1.8 23.7 2.2 13.9 1.3 11.6 2.8 
AD 23.3 3.6 63.2 13.8 14.0 2.4 8.9 4.8 4.9 3.3 21.7 4.3 14.7 4.5 11.4 3.0 
PPA 19.0 8.2 43.7 23.4 10.8 6.4 8.5 8.5 2.2 1.9 13.0 6.8 9.2 5.0 8.7 4.2 
Note: the table shows the average uncorrected scores for MMSE, ACE-R total score, ACE-R subscales and FAB in 
the different groups of participants. 
 
3.3.2 Experimental tasks: Behaviour 
Univariate ANOVA on total naming accuracy revealed a significant effect of Group (F(3, 
41) = 18.78, p < .001). Pairwise comparisons (see Figure 7) revealed that Ctrls’ total accuracy 
score was higher than both AD and PPA groups (AD p < .01; PPA p < .001), while the 
difference between Ctrls and bvFTD was only marginally significant (p = .056). Moreover, 
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both bvFTD and AD groups performed significantly better than PPA (bvFTD p < .001; AD p < 
.01). 
Figure 7 
 
Note: The graph shows the mean of the total accuracy scores across the different groups of participants on the 
picture naming (a) and word-to-picture matching (b) tasks. * indicates p < .01 and ** indicates p < .001. 
 
Table 15 
Task Group 
Accuracy Scores Consistency Scores 
Natural Artificial Natural Artificial 
Things Group Things Group Things Group Things Group 
Picture 
naming 
Ctrls 21,8 2,0 22,8 1,3 23,5 1,0 23,8 0,5 7,8 0,4 7,9 0,3 7,9 0,3 8,0 0,0 
bvFTD 16,2 3,3 19,1 1,6 21,3 2,3 20,4 3,5 6,5 1,1 7,6 0,5 7,8 0,4 7,7 0,7 
AD 16,5 5,6 16,4 5,0 20,3 4,6 17,9 6,1 6,9 1,4 6,7 1,3 7,4 1,0 7,0 1,3 
PPA 8,8 6,5 12,8 6,8 11,8 7,0 10,5 8,9 4,0 2,3 5,3 2,5 4,7 2,7 4,0 2,9 
Word-to-
picture 
matching 
Ctrls 23,1 1,3 22,6 2,6 23,5 0,9 22,0 1,1 8,0 0,0 7,9 0,5 8,0 0,0 8,0 0,2 
bvFTD 22,8 1,1 22,1 1,5 23,6 0,5 21,4 1,4 8,0 0,0 8,0 0,0 8,0 0,0 8,0 0,0 
AD 22,0 1,6 20,2 3,5 22,7 2,3 20,1 2,4 8,0 0,0 7,9 0,3 8,0 0,0 8,0 0,0 
PPA 21,0 1,9 20,4 3,2 22,6 2,1 20,2 2,4 8,0 0,0 8,0 0,0 8,0 0,0 7,8 0,5 
Note: Mean and standard deviations of the Accuracy scores  and Consistency scores on both Picture Naming and 
Word-to-picture matching tasks 
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The repeated-measure ANOVA on the naming consistency revealed a significant main 
effect of group (F(3,40) = 16.28, p < .001) and significant interactions of Naturality * Group, 
(F(3, 40) = 3.40, p < .05), Humanking * Naturality * Group (F(3, 40) = 5.53, p < .01), 
Humankind * Education (F(1,40) = 5.51, p < .05) and a trend for Humankind * Group (F(3,40) 
= 2.78, p = .053). Pairwise comparisons (see Table 15) revealed that PPA patients performed 
overall worse than all the other groups (all ps < .001), that bvFTD patients performed worse 
on natural entities than artificial entities (p < .01) and more specifically they named worse 
natural things than artificial things (p = .001). Moreover, PPA patients’ consistency scores on 
natural groups were higher than their scores on natural things (p < .01) and artificial groups 
(p < .001), and their performance on artificial things were higher than the one on artificial 
groups (p < .05). 
Univariate ANOVA on total accuracy score of word-to-picture matching revealed a 
significant main effect of Group (F(3, 40) = 3.47, p < .05), with AD patients performing 
marginally worse than Ctrls  (p = .067) (see Figure 7). The repeated-measure ANOVA on 
word-to-picture matching consistency scores did not reveal any significant result (see Table 
15). 
3.3.3 VBM  
VBM analyses revealed significant clusters of results only in two conditions (VBM on 
Humankind and Naturality), when corrected for family-wise error (FWE) at the cluster-level 
(see Table 16 and 17), and hence the results will be reported uncorrected, with p < .001.  
The VBM analysis on each semantic category (see Figure 8 and Table 15) showed that 
naming performance on natural things was associated to the atrophy of right inferior 
temporal cortex (fusiform gyrus and middle temporal gyrus) and right occipito-parietal 
cortex (precuneus, cuneus), while artificial things did not revealed any significant area. 
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Figure 8 
 
Note: VBM results showing the areas associated to the deficit in naming pictures of natural things (green), 
natural groups (yellow) and artificial groups (violet).  
 
Table 16 
Category Anatomical label Cluster size T x y z 
Natural things Right temporal pole 734 4.26 47 8 -45 
   
4.06 38 -9 -50 
   
3.78 54 2 -41 
 
Right precuneus 181 4.10 18 -56 14 
   
3.76 18 -48 17 
 
Right middle temporal gyrus 243 3.87 65 -8 -32 
   
3.65 48 -8 -30 
   
3.55 57 -5 -32 
Natural groups Left medial orbital gyrus 492 4.49 -12 18 -26 
 
Left temporal pole 546 4.23 -24 8 -27 
   
3.72 -23 -9 -35 
 
Left cerebellum (Crus II) 76 4.12 27 -74 -20 
 
Left anterior insula 197 3.90 -33 17 -12 
 
Left anterior cingulate 217 3.79 -15 45 3 
   
3.78 -6 47 8 
 
Left middle temporal gyrus 77 3.66 -65 -26 -14 
 
Left hippocampus 71 3.60 -26 -24 -15 
Artificial groups Right temporal pole 203 3.96 39 18 -48 
   
3.91 33 24 -45 
Note: The table shows the significant clusters of VBM analysis on the picture naming consistency scores. Results 
are reported uncorrected with p < .001 
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Moreover naming artificial groups was associated with the atrophy of right anterior 
temporal cortex (fusiform gyrus and middle temporal gyrus), anteriorly to the area associated 
to natural things, while natural groups were associated to left temporal cortex (hippocampus, 
parahippocampal gyrus, superior and middle temporal gyri, fusiform gyrus and amygdala), 
left insula, left prefrontal cortex (ACC, medial and orbital prefrontal cortex) and right 
cerebellum.  
A second VBM on Humankind (see Table 16 and Figure 9) revealed that naming human 
stimuli (social groups) was associated with the atrophy of left frontal cortex (mainly left 
medial and orbital prefrontal cortices, ACC and left posterior inferior frontal gyrus), left 
temporal cortex, left parietal cortex, left insula and cerebellum (mainly in the right 
hemisphere). No specific area was associated with picture naming tapping non-social 
knowledge. 
The third VBM on Naturality (see Table 18 and Figure 10) showed two distinct sets of 
areas. While the deficit at naming artificial entities was associated with the atrophy of left 
prefrontal cortex (middle and superior frontal gyri), the deficit at naming natural entities was 
associated with bilateral inferior temporal cortices, occipito-temporal areas and right 
precuneus. 
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Figure 9 
 
Note: VBM results showing the areas associated to the deficit in naming pictures of social groups 
 
Table 17 
Category Anatomical label Cluster size T x y z 
Social groups Left anterior cingulate* 6309 5.47 -15 42 2 
   
5.20 -29 33 -6 
   
5.11 -2 45 20 
 
Right cerebellum (Crus II) 816 4.82 45 -63 -45 
   
4.49 51 -65 -35 
 
Left superior frontal gyrus 526 4.16 -5 41 44 
   
3.96 -8 33 57 
 
Right middle frontal gyrus 497 4.67 42 32 35 
 
Left angular gyrus 337 4.28 -45 -66 45 
   
3.62 -47 -54 50 
 
Left middle temporal gyrus 286 4.06 -63 -24 -14 
 
Left inferior frontal gyrus  172 3.73 -47 11 20 
 
 
 
3.57 -51 3 20 
 
Left inferior temporal gyrus 122 3.66 -50 -9 -41 
 
Left middle temporal gyrus 84 4.18 -62 -48 8 
 
Left cerebellum (Crus II) 64 4.14 -38 -77 -41 
  Left middle frontal gyrus 56 3.63 -29 63 8 
Note: The table shows the significant clusters of VBM analysis on the picture naming consistency scores.  * 
indicates that the cluster survives the correction for the family-wise error (p < .05). All the other results are 
reported uncorrected with p < .001 
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Figure 10 
 
Note: VBM results showing the areas associated to the deficit in naming pictures of natural entities (blue) and 
artificial entities (red).  
 
Table 17 
Category Anatomical label Cluster size T x y z 
Natural Left fusiform gyrus* 1040 4.34 -26 -8 -39 
   
3.76 -23 5 -50 
   
3.71 -33 -9 -29 
 
Right precuneus 242 4.22 20 -56 14 
   
4.16 18 -48 17 
 
Right temporal pole 666 4.05 47 9 -47 
   
3.89 35 8 -26 
   
3.71 36 8 -35 
 
Right middle temporal gyrus 295 4.05 65 -6 -33 
   
3.76 62 -18 -30 
 
Left superior temporal gyrus 145 3.90 -38 5 -20 
 
Left temporal pole 54 3.89 -48 15 -41 
 
Right supramarginal gyrus 87 3.68 54 -39 56 
     3.66 47 -42 56 
Artificial Left middle frontal gyrus 317 4.43 -42 41 36 
   
4.42 -42 29 42 
   
3.63 -38 32 36 
 
Left superior frontal gyrus 332 4.17 -5 62 18 
   
3.71 -18 60 15 
   
3.64 -14 68 15 
 
Left frontal pole 61 3.98 -27 63 5 
     3.55 -29 59 12 
Note: The table shows the significant clusters of VBM analysis on the picture naming consistency scores.  * 
indicates that the cluster survives the correction for the family-wise error (p < .05). All the other results are 
reported uncorrected with p < .001 
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3.4 Discussion 
In the current study we investigated whether the conceptual knowledge about social 
groups might be organized into sensory and functional components. To achieve this aim, in 
addition to the categories of animals (natural things) and artifacts (artificial things), we tested 
the semantic knowledge of social groups defined by their perceptual features (natural groups) 
and defined by their functional features (artificial groups) in patients with different 
neurodegenerative diseases (bvFTD, AD, PPA) and in healthy controls.  
Results showed that each patient group performed worse than Ctrls on picture naming, 
and that PPA patients performed worse than bvFTD and AD patients. Conversely, patients 
were only mildly impaired at recognizing the items in the word-to-picture matching task. This 
asymmetry might be explained at least by two factors: one related to patients’ cognitive 
deficits and the other to task-specific features. Indeed one possibility is that patients in the 
study have impaired lexical production, but spared recognition abilities. The other factor to 
take into account is that in this task patients are required to choose between four possible 
options in the word-to-picture matching, in contrast with the number of possible choices in 
the picture naming task, leading this latter task to be much more sensitive than the former to 
semantic deficits.  
The first VBM analysis revealed that the naming performance with natural things 
(animals) was associated with the atrophy of right anterior inferior temporal cortex and 
precuneus, confirming the findings of previous studies (Brambati et al., 2006, Damasio et al., 
1996, Devlin et al., 2002), while no areas was found to be selectively associated with 
knowledge about artificial things. Moreover, the same analysis revealed the association 
between left orbito-frontal and anterior temporal cortices and naming natural groups, and 
between right anterior temporal cortex and artificial groups. This dissociation might reflect a 
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difference in the stimuli valence. Indeed, it was not possible to match the valence of the two 
stimuli categories, with natural groups being more negative than artificial groups (p > .05).  
The VBM analysis on humankind revealed a set of areas, whose atrophy is associated to 
social group (natural and artificial groups) naming deficit, while no area was associated to 
non-human entities (natural and artificial things) deficit. Differently from deficits affecting 
other semantic categories, those affecting the social group semantics were associated with a 
set of areas frequently associated with affective processing: left medial (including ACC) and 
orbital prefrontal cortex, insula and left posterior inferior frontal gyrus. Indeed, in 
neuroimaging studies on emotions, the activation of insula is quite often associated with that 
of ACC and the pars opercularis of IFG (Craig, 2009). Their concurrent activation of ACC and 
insula/IFG is thought to represent, respectively, complementary limbic motor and sensory 
areas, and their coupled activity could be relevant in emotional processing in the same fashion 
as somatosensory and motor cortices are for manual dexterity (Craig, 2009; 2011). While 
insula/IFG are relevant to integrate interoceptive and environmental inputs in order to form 
emotional representations, the ACC might be relevant in the engendering motivation and 
initiation of behaviour (Craig, 2009; 2011; Holroyd and Yeung, 2012). The association of 
emotion-processing areas and social group naming impairment is in contrast with the 
assumption proposing a distinction between stereotype and prejudice (Amodio, 2014). 
Indeed the lexical-semantic knowledge impairment should only involve the lesion of the 
stereotype network and not the prejudice network (insula, orbitofrontal PFC). 
Our results converge on the findings from both neuropsychological (Piretti et al., 2015) 
and functional neuroimaging (Chedid et al., 2016) studies. In the study reported in the 
previous chapter (Piretti et al., 2015), we found that lexical-semantic deficits in naming social 
groups were associated to the lesion of a left-lateralized set of areas (IFG, insula, amygdala 
and superior anterior temporal cortex), while Chedid et al. (2016) reported the activation of 
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bilateral areas (IFG, MFG, medial prefrontal cortex, middle temporal gyrus and occipital 
areas) when participants judge the profession of both names and pictures of famous people 
(and hence categorizing individuals according to the social group they belong to). Taken 
together, these findings suggest that social groups, or more broadly, conspecifics knowledge, 
differently from other categories, relies on affective processing.  
A further VBM analysis on naturality revealed two distinct patterns of atrophy, 
associated to deficits in naming natural and artificial entities. If on the one hand, the deficit 
affecting natural entity knowledge was associated with the bilateral atrophy of anterior 
inferior temporal cortices, on the other, deficit affecting artificial entity knowledge was 
associated with the atrophy of left dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex. This distinction might 
mirror two different processing modalities depending on the content of the concept: the 
former is associated with visual processing and the latter with motor processing. Indeed, after 
the perception of a visual stimulus, its processing might follow two distinct pathways starting 
from the striate occipital cortex: a ventral stream through the occipito-temporal cortex, up to 
the inferior anterior temporal lobe, which is involved in encoding objects’ identities, and a 
dorsal stream, going through occipito-parietal cortex to the inferior parietal lobule but with 
probably further extensions to the DLPFC, encoding spatial information, necessary for visually 
guided actions (for reviews see Kravitz et al., 2011; 2013). Furthermore DLPFC was 
associated with planning, preparation and execution of motor actions (Hoshi and Tanji, 2007) 
and is very frequently associated to the activation of premotor cortex and supplementary 
motor area during fMRI experiments on motor imagery (Hetù et al., 2013). Taken together, 
this findings seem to suggest that entities which are highly defined by their perceptual/visual 
features, as natural things (animals) and groups (e.g., ethnic groups) might be represented at 
the anterior part of the ventral visual pathway, whereas entities defined more by their 
functional features, as artificial things (objects) and groups (professions) might be 
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represented at the level of the most anterior part of the dorsal visual stream, which is thought 
to be relevant for motor representation.  
From a theoretical point of view, our findings seem to confirm the importance of 
modality-specific processing areas in category-specific conceptual representations.  
Although they are not sufficient to reject the DSH (Mahon and Caramazza, 2009), our 
findings seem more easily explained by different theories proposing that unimodal-
processing areas are relevant for the emergence of category-specific deficits, including the 
SFT (Warrington and Shallice, 1984), and CTT (Simmons and Barsalou, 2003) and the Hub-
and-Spokes theory (Patterson et al., 2007). Further studies are necessary to establish whether 
low-level modality-processing areas are necessary for semantic representation or if concepts 
are recoded into modality specific semantic representations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 91 
CHAPTER 4 
Is left inferior frontal gyrus involved in social group processing? 
 
Abstract 
The posterior part (pars opercularis) of inferior frontal gyrus (IFGop) has recently been 
suggested to be associated with the semantic processing of social groups. However, the 
specific contribution of IFGop in this type of processing remains unclear. It has been 
suggested first, that the IFGop might be involved in categorical semantic knowledge about 
human stimuli and second that it might constitute an emotional component, involved in the 
processing of social groups. In the current study, I applied double-pulse transcranial magnetic 
stimulation on inferior frontal gyrus, inferior parietal lobe and vertex on 18 healthy 
participants while they were performing a priming task. The task included three categories of 
stimuli: living entities, non-living entities and social groups. I found that the stimulation of 
IFGop did not influence participants’ performances on the three categories of items. 
Conversely, the same stimulation significantly slowed responses on negative stimuli, 
regardless of the category. Together, these results suggested that the involvement of the 
IFGop in social group processing is implicated in the processing of emotional features. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
From more than a century, starting with the classical studies of Paul Broca, the left 
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) has primarily been associated with language production (Broca, 
1861; Dejerine, 1914). This area is located within the lateral surface of frontal cortex, between 
Rolandic, Sylvian and inferior frontal sulci. Anatomically, IFG is composed by three distinct 
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sub-regions: the anterior orbital part (pars orbitalis), the central triangular part  (pars 
triangularis, IFGtr) and the posterior opercular part (pars opercularis, IFGop). While the 
importance of IFG in language processing has been confirmed (Price, 2010), a huge amount of 
literature suggests that it might play a role even in other cognitive domains. Indeed IFG has 
been associated to motor processing (Molnar-Szacacs et al., 2005), executive functions (Aron 
et al., 2003) and emotion processing (Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Yamasaki et al., 2002). A large 
body of literature, including electroencephalography, functional neuroimaging, TMS, and a 
few neuropsychological studies, linked IFGop to action observation and imitation (Pazzaglia 
et al., 2008, Fazio et al., 2009; for review, see: Iacoboni, 2009; Cattaneo & Rizzolatti, 2009) and 
motor imagery (Hetù et al., 2013). IFGop shows activity when participants observe and 
perform (imitate) other people’s actions (especially involving hands), and it is thought to be 
the neural substrate, together with the inferior parietal lobe (IPL), of imitation, as part of the 
‘mirror neuron system’ (MNS). Neurons in F5 (which is thought to be the homologous of 
IFGop in humans) have been found to fire when the monkey observe or execute goal directed 
actions (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992), and this region has first been proposed to be the neural 
precursor of human imitation (Cattaneo and Rizzolatti, 2009). According to some authors 
(Wilson, 2005; Gallese, 2004), the MNS, allows the simulation of other people’s actions, and it 
is necessary in order to understand and imitate them, as well as other people’s intentions, 
emotions or mental states. 
In addition to the linguistic and motor functions attributed to the IFGop, another 
function that has recently been associated with the IFGop is the emotional processing. Indeed 
this region has frequently found to be activated in fMRI studies, when emotionally salient 
stimuli are presented (Yamasaki et al., 2002; Koelsch et al., 2006; Jabbi and Keysers, 2008), 
and facial emotion recognition (Rosen et al., 2006; Adolphs et al., 2000) and empathy 
(Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009) deficits were reported following lesions of the IFG. However, 
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many studies in the field of affective neuroscience found that emotional stimuli tend to elicit 
the activity of both anterior insula and IFGop (for review see Craig, 2009). It has been 
proposed that insula and IFGop represent limbic sensory areas that are involved in the 
integration of interoceptive and environmental information, in order to achieve emotional 
perceptions (Critchley et al., 2004; Craig, 2011). Specifically, the involvement of IFGop in the 
voluntary control and perception of emotional facial expressions, its role in processing 
affective stimuli and empathy, suggest that the IFGop, together with the insula, constitute a 
hub that connects the affective and motor networks, as also suggested by animal studies 
(Jezzini et al., 2015; Gerbella et al., 2016; Morecraft et al., 2012). 
More recently, a handful of neuroimaging and neuropsychological studies found the 
implication of the opercular part of the IFG in processing semantic information about 
conspecifics (Piretti et al., 2015; Chedid et al., 2016; Zahn et al., 2007; Skipper et al., 2011). 
However the role of the IFGop in this particular type of processing needs to be better 
specified. Different hypothesis have been put forward. According to the motor simulation 
theories, conspecifics knowledge might be associated with IFGop because, differently from 
other categories (e.g., artificial things, plants and animals), human stimuli are imitable 
(Wilson, 2005). In this context, the automatic and unconscious simulation of actions would be 
relevant in order to infer others’ intentions and hence, for mentalization (Gallese et al., 2003; 
2004). While action-related mentalizing might easily explain some findings concerning the 
knowledge about professions (implying actions and tool use) (Chedid et al., 2016), it does not 
appear to explain the association in patients of the IFGop with the lexical-semantic 
impairment in recognizing other social groups (e.g., ethnic groups, see Piretti et al., 2015), 
because these latter concepts are less obviously linked to action related features.  
An alternative view holds that the association between IFGop and conspecifics 
knowledge might be due to the intrinsic emotional value of social stimuli. Many studies 
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showed that social cognition (including theory of mind, empathy, social decision making, and 
moral judgment) and emotional processing tend to elicit the same neural network, including 
IFGop (for review, see Olsson and Ochsner, 2008). Although this overlap in brain areas of 
emotional and social processes is far from being understood, it has been proposed that the re-
enactment of emotional states might be involved in the representation of social knowledge 
and in high-order social processes (Niedenthal et al., 2005). 
Based on the above reviewed evidence, in the present study I tested the hypothesis 
that IFGop might be a key region in the categorical processing of conspecifics. In order to 
answer this question I tested participants on a classical priming paradigm, using three 
categories of stimuli (i.e., living entities, non-living entities and social groups), in which they 
were asked to judge whether the target was a real word or a pseudo-word (lexical decision 
task). Moreover transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) was applied between prime and 
target presentation, just before the participants responded, on three sites IFGop, IPL and 
vertex (VTX). My hypothesis was that, if IFGop is selectively involved in processing 
conspecifics (regardless of the valence), its stimulation would disrupt the priming effect only 
for the social groups, while IPL stimulation (which is thought to be involved in non-living 
entities processing, see e.g., Brambati et al., 2006) would interfere with the priming effect of 
the non-living entities. However, if the two areas are involved in categorical processing, their 
stimulation would also induce slower lexical decisions for targets belonging, respectively, to 
the category of social groups and non-living entities. Conversely, if the involvement of IFGop 
in conspecifics processing is triggered only by the processing of emotional features, I expect 
that, when this region is stimulated (compared to the other two), participants’ lexical 
decisions reaction times (RT) to the target words would be biased by the valence of the 
stimuli (i.e., positive, negative). Specifically, RT are expected to be slower when IFGop was 
stimulated than in the control condition, consistently with the fMRI studies in which IFGop 
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has been found to be associated with the processing of negative emotions (Kotz et al., 2002; 
Murphy et al., 2003; Kuchinke et al., 2005; Blair et al., 207; Goldin et al., 2008). 
4.2 Methods  
4.2.1 Participants 
Eighteen participants (female = 14, age = 25.11 ± 3.55, years of education = 17.33 ± 
2.72) took part to the study. Inclusion criteria were: to be Italian-native speaker, right-handed 
and to fulfil safety criteria for TMS (absence of neurological, psychiatric or cardiological 
conditions, acoustic prosthesis or pacemakers implantation, pregnancy). Each participant 
signed an informed consent, approved by SISSA Ethics Committee (Trieste, Italy), before 
taking part to the experiment, but was not informed about the purpose of the study until the 
end of it. 
4.2.2 Stimuli 
In order to select the target stimuli 14 participants were asked to rate the same words 
of the database used for the stimuli selection in chapter three, along four variables - age of 
acquisition (AoA), familiarity (Fam), imagenability (Ima) and valence (Val) - on a 1 to 9 point 
scale (except for AoA which was rated on a 1 to 7 point scale). For each category (living 
things, non-living things and social groups), 10 words were selected, matched for letter 
length, AoA, Fam, Ima and Val. Then, from this original sample of target words, words were 
sorted into two different subsets (N =10 and N =10) according to their valence (positive, 
negative) and independently of the category they belonged to. A 2 analysis revealed that 
overall positive and negative items did not differ (positive: 2 (1) = .33, p = .56; negative: 2 (2) 
= .00, p = 1.0). All pseudo-words were generated by Wuggy 0.2.0b2 Italian pseudo-word 
generator (http://crr.ugent.be/programs-data/wuggy), changing one-to-three consonants to 
the real target words. Pseudo-words were pronounceable according to the Italian 
phonological rules and their length was the same as that of the legal target words. Prime 
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words were superordinate category nouns: animali (animals), cose (objects), persone 
(persons). 
4.2.3 Experimental procedure 
A PC running E-Prime 2.1 allowed the presentation of the stimuli and the recording of 
responses. Stimuli were projected via 19-inches CRT monitor with resolution of 1280*1024 
pixels and a screen frame rate of 60Hz. Figure 11 depicts the sequence of events in a trial of 
the priming experiment: first the prime (i.e., animals, objects, persons) was presented, 
followed by a target word which could be real (e.g., ‘cani’ which means ‘dogs’) or a pseudo-
word (e.g., ‘bami’). More specifically, after a fixation cross (duration: 500 ms), the prime word 
was displayed for 125 ms and was followed by a second fixation cross (duration: 250 ms). 
During this latter fixation cross, 100 ms before target onset, a double-pulse stimulation was 
delivered (two stimulations with 100 ms of interval). Hence the last TMS pulse was 
temporally synchronized with the onset of the target word. Target words, which were 
presented in random order (avoiding the repetition of the same target in two consecutive 
trials), stayed on the screen until participant’s response, with a deadline of 2000 ms. In order 
to avoid possible confounds associated to the stimulation of the previous trial, a 5000 ms 
interval was inserted between trials, and then the maximum duration for each trial was 7875 
ms. Participants were asked to judge whether the word displayed was a real word or a 
pseudo-word, by pressing one of two keys (e.g., pressing either the left button if the word 
‘exists’ and the right button if it ‘does not exist’),  the side of which was counterbalanced 
across participants. Since the TMS was mainly targeted to left-lateralized areas, participant 
responded using the task execution only their left index and middle fingers. Before the 
experiment proper, participants were given 25 practice trials with different stimuli. 
The experimental task was presented three times, in three different blocks. In each 
block, which included 180 trials (30 words and 30 non-words applied to three priming 
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conditions) participants were stimulated in different sites (IFGop, IPL, VTX), and the order of 
stimulation was counterbalanced across participants. In order to avoid discomfort or 
tiredness, that can be experienced when TMS is applied, a short break were inserted every 60 
trials. Each participant performed the tasks in two different days (range: 1-4 days), with two 
blocks in the first day and one block in the second day, in order to avoid possible effects 
associated to tiredness. The average time for completing one block was around 25 minutes. 
Figure 11 
 
Note. The figure shows a schematic illustration of the task performed in the experiment. 
4.2.4 Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation 
4.2.4.1 MR image co-registration and stimulation sites 
Prior to the experiment, a high-resolution anatomical T1-weighted magnetic resonance 
images was acquired for each participant. In order to precisely position the TMS coil on the 
stimulation sites, individual brains were normalized into Montreal Neurological Institute 
(MNI) space manually by setting anterior commissure and posterior commissure in 
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Brainsight 2.1.5 software (www.rogue-resolutions.com). TMS coil and the of participants’ 
head were recognized and tracked using a Polaris Vicra Optical Tracking Systems (Polaris, 
Northern Digital, Ontario, Canada), so that the position of TMS coil could be positioned to the 
selected target site level. Stimulation sites were identified on each reconstruction brain on the 
basis of macro-anatomical landmarks (nasion, tip of nose, left and right lateral canthi, and left 
and right tragi). The sites of stimulation were left IFGop, left IPL and VTX. Left IFG was chosen 
based on previous findings, since lesion to this region has been associated with naming 
impairment for social groups (as reported in the studies included in Chapters 2 and 3 of this 
thesis) or retrieval of general person knowledge (Simmons, et al., 2010; Chedid et al., 2016)  
(see Figure 12); whereas left IPL was found involved in processing artefacts in previous TMS 
study (Pobric, et al., 2010; Brambati et al., 2006). VTX session was used as a control condition 
and was set manually in T1-weighted structural image for each participant. MNI coordinates 
for the stimulation sites in current experiment were l-IFG (x = -48, y = 1, z = 15), l-IPL (x = -49, 
y = -44, z = 48) (see Figure 13).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 99 
Figure 12 
Note. Figure summarizes the findings reported in the previous chapters of the thesis, associating IFGop 
and conspecifics processing: in blue the results from the meta-analysis in Chapter 1), in red, from the 
neuropsychological study on brain tumor patients (Chapter 2) and, in green, from the study on patients with 
dementia (chapter 3).  Yellow indicates an overlapping between the findings of the studies on patients with brain 
tumors and dementia, while purple indicates the overlapping of results from the meta-analysis and the study on 
brain tumor patients. 
Figure 13 
 
Note. Figure shows the location of the specific sites of stimulation: IFGop (blue) and IPL (red) 
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4.2.4.2 TMS parameters 
Paired-pulse TMS was performed by two 200² units connected to a BiStim2 module 
(Magstim Company, Whitland, UK). A 70 mm figure-of-eight coil was used to delivered TMS 
pulse. The interval between two pulses was set to 100 msec in order to better inhibit the 
activity of the target sites (Chen, et al., 1997; Oshio, et al., 2010). During the experiment, the 
coil was held by mechanical arm and maintained tangential to the skull with the handle 
pointing towards the midline. 
The stimulation intensity used in the experiment was set at 90% of the individual 
resting motor threshold (mean = 30.66%, SD = 3.77% of maximum stimulator output 
intensity), which was defined as the intensity of single-pulse stimulation that evoked 5 out of 
10 visible finger/hand motor responses for the participant. For every participant, the motor 
threshold was measured before the stimulation procedure, in both days of experiment.  
4.2.5 Data Analysis 
All the analyses were performed using SPSS (version 21.0.0.0, 
https://www.ibm.com/analytics/us/en/technology/spss/). Only trials with corrected 
responses and with real-word target were included. After a logarithmic transformation of the 
RT (necessary to normalize RT distribution), I filtered trials with logRT exceeding more than 
two standard deviations from the mean of each subject and each block. In order to reduce the 
influence of different testing session, we performed a z-transformation of the logRT, using 
means and standard deviations of each participant and block, and used this score (ZRT) for all 
the analyses. After the filtering procedure the 8.0% of trials were excluded from the analysis. 
In order to evaluate the priming effect we calculated the Priming size, subtracting from the 
ZRT of each congruent trial (e.g., prime = ‘animals’; target = ‘dogs’) the average ZRT of 
incongruent trials (e.g., prime = ‘objects’, ‘persons’; target = ‘dogs’) for each category of items 
in each of the three stimulation sites. A priming effect should lead to negative values of the 
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priming size. Since a the priming effect was present for all the categories of all participants, I 
selected for each category, only the participants with a Priming size lower than zero at the 
level of the VTX, that served as a control condition (N = 10 for living entities; N = 12 for non-
living entities, N = 8 for social groups). Then, for each category, I performed repeated-
measure ANOVA, using the Priming size as dependent variable and the different stimulation 
sites as between-subject factor. However, since TMS might interfere also with the semantic 
access to the target word, regardless of the prime, I performed a repeated-measure analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) on the mean ZRT for each category of targets, using as within-subject 
factors the site of stimulation (IFG, IPL, VTX) and the target category (living things, non-living 
things, social groups). Moreover, a second ANOVA using the site of stimulation and the target 
valence (positive, negative) as factors was performed. Pairwise comparisons were performed 
using Bonferroni correction.  
4.3 Results 
The total accuracy was 97.7% (SD = 0.02%) for pseudo-words and 98.4% (SD = 
0.013%) for words.  
4.3.1 Categories 
Repeated-measure ANOVAs on priming size (see Figure 14) on the non-living entity 
category revealed a significant main effect of site (F(2, 22) = 6.01, p < .01), with higher 
priming size score when the stimulation occurred at the level of IPL than of the VTX. The same 
analysis on the other categories did not reveal any significant main effect of site (ps > .05).  
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Figure 14 
 
Note. The graph shows the priming size on the three different categories of targets, for the three sites of 
stimulation. ** p < .01 
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The repeated-measure ANOVA on target category (see Figure 15 and Table 19) 
revealed only a significant main effect of Category (F(2, 34) = 14.10, p < .001). Indeed non-
living things were associated with slower ZRT than both living things (p < .01) and social 
groups (p < .001).  
 
Figure15 
 
Note. The graph shows ZRT of the three categories of targets for the three stimulation sites. * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
 
 
Table 19 
Target category 
Site Living things Non-living things Social groups 
IFG -0,04 ± 0,17 0,13 ± 0,15 -0,09 ± 0,15 
IPL -0,03 ± 0,11 0,13 ± 0,19 -0,11 ± 0,2 
VTX -0,06 ± 0,16 0,13 ± 0,19 -0,06 ± 0,18 
Note. The table shows the means and standard deviations of ZRT of the three categories of targets, on 
the three stimulation sites. 
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4.3.2 Valence 
The repeated-measure ANOVA on target valence (see Figure 16 and Table 20) revealed 
a significant main effect of valence (F(1, 17) = 13.82, p < .001) and a significant interaction of 
valence x site (F(2, 34) = 4.20, p < .05). Negative stimuli were overall recognized slower than 
positive (p < .01) and, more specifically, negative stimuli were associated to slower RT than 
positive during the stimulation of both IFG (p = .01) and IPL (p < .05). Moreover, negative 
stimuli were processed more slowly in the stimulation of IFG than the VTX (p < .05) but not 
the IPL (p = .21).  
 
Figure 16 
 
Note. The graph shows ZRT on the target valence, for the three stimulation sites. * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
 
Table 20 
Target Valence 
Site Negative Positive 
IFG 0,21 ± 0,15 -0,07 ± 0,16 
IPL 0,14 ± 0,12 -0,03 ± 0,15 
VTX 0,08 ± 0,15 0,01 ± 0,13 
Note. The table shows the means and standard deviations of ZRT of the stimuli modulated by target 
valence, on the three stimulation sites. 
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4.4 Discussion 
The aim of the study was to test whether IFGop was selectively implicated in 
processing conspecifics. To test this hypothesis I had participants perform a priming study 
with three semantic categories – animate entities, inanimate entities and social groups - while 
I applied the TMS on participants’ IFGop. As control conditions we also stimulated IPL and 
VTX. Results revealed that only for the non-living category, the priming size was significantly 
higher when the IPL was stimulated relative to the VTX. IFGop did not show any significant 
difference with both IPL and VTX. These results confirmed what reported previously by both 
TMS (Pobric et al., 2010), neuropsychological (Brambati et al., 2006) and functional 
neuroimaging (Vitali et al., 2005) studies in which IPL was found to be implicated in semantic 
processing of non-living entities. Importantly, the main effect of category did not reach the 
significance threshold for either living entities or social groups. Moreover, the lack of 
association between IFGop and social group processing was confirmed by the results on the 
ZRT of the different target categories (from the lexical decision task) for the different sites of 
stimulation. Social groups did not show slower ZRT during the IFGop stimulation compared to 
when the other brain sites were stimulated. Indeed, only a main effect of category emerged, 
with non-living entities showing slower ZRT compared with the other categories, as also 
reported in other studies (e.g., Cattaneo et al., 2010). These results, together with the finding 
of the studies associating conspecifics processing and IFGop (Piretti et al., 2015; Chedid et al., 
2016; Zahn et al., 2007; Skipper et al., 2011), suggests that IFGop could be involved in 
processing emotional stimuli, regardless of the semantic category.  
The analysis of reaction times of the valence revealed that negative stimuli were 
recognized more slowly than positive stimuli, consistently with previous evidence (Estes and 
Verges, 2008). This effect has been assimilated to a freezing response (i.e., general 
suppression of motor activity) to threatening stimuli (Fox et al., 2001), which might be 
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adapting in reducing the likelihood of being detected by dangerous entities. However this 
phenomenon has frequently been found only when stimulus valence was irrelevant for the 
accurate response (i.e., lexical decision task), as in the present study. Indeed, when 
participants pay attention to the valence (i.e., valence judgment), negative stimuli tend to 
elicit faster responses than positive items (Estes and Vargas, 2008; Grecucci et al., 2011). This 
phenomenon is thought to occur because attention tend to be disengaged more slowly from 
negative stimuli than other stimuli (Fox et al., 2001; Yend and Mathews, 2001), but when the 
access to the valence is relevant for the correct response of the task, the attentional 
disengagement from the valence of the stimulus is not required and the motor system might 
be prepared for immediate action (Estes and Vargas, 2008).  
However, the analysis of target valence also revealed that the stimulation on IFGop was 
associated to slower ZRT than the one on the VTX. This finding is consistent with the role of 
IFGop in processing emotional stimuli (Baird et al., 2011). Specifically, this region appears to 
be selectively involved in processing negative emotions, thus confirming previous findings 
(Kotz et al., 2002; Murphy et al., 2003; Kuchinke et al., 2005; Blair et al., 207; Goldin et al., 
2008). 
Together these results suggest that IFGop is not relevant in the categorical processing 
of conspecifics and, apparently, seem to be in contrast with the studies reported about social 
group, and, more broadly, on conspecifics knowledge (Zahn et al., 2007; Piretti et al, 2015; 
Chedid et al., 2016). Indeed, the accurate matching of valence did not show any association 
between IFGop and knowledge about social groups. However, the stimulation of IFGop was 
associated with slower RT for the judgment of negative stimuli, and this is consistent with the 
hypothesis that, in the context of semantically processing social groups, IFGop might be 
involved in processing their emotional content. Further research is necessary, in order to 
confirm the role of IFGop in the processing of social emotional features. 
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CHAPTER 5 
General discussion 
 
 
In the current thesis, I investigated how the knowledge of conspecifics, living and non-
living entities is represented in the brain. Results showed that, naming pictures of social 
groups was selectively impaired in patients both with focal lesions (brain tumors) and diffuse 
brain atrophy (neurodegenerative diseases) in the left hemisphere. Overall, this set of areas 
includes insula, inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), amygdala (only in Chapter 2 in tumor patients), 
and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) (only Chapter 3 in dementia patients), areas often found 
to be associated with affective processing (for review, see Pessoa, 2008). Moreover, a further 
investigation on healthy participants revealed that the stimulation of a specific area within the 
opercular part of IFG (IFGop), which was found associated with conspecifics knowledge in the 
meta-analysis and in both the neuropsychological studies in this thesis, led to slower response 
time when the valence of the stimuli was negative. In this section I will discuss how these 
findings, including the anatomical lateralization, can be accommodated within current models 
on person-specific recognition and general semantic knowledge. 
The investigation of conspecific knowledge has for long coincided with the study of 
semantic memory for familiar and famous persons. In the light of these studies, Bruce and 
Young  (1986) proposed a model, revised by Burton et al. (1990, 1999) and, more recently, by 
Blank et al. (2014), to explain how we recognize individuals from faces, voices and names. The 
model proposed that distinct recognition units would encode specific-persons’ face, voice and 
name representations, and that each recognition unit would be connected to a person identity 
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node (PIN), involved in the multimodal representation of each individual. The different 
versions of the model do not agree on how person-related information (e.g., the social group 
they belong to) is recollected. On the one hand, each PIN is relevant in forming a multi-modal 
semantic representation of the other individuals, including person-related semantic 
information (Bruce and Young, 1986), while on the other, they would be connected to the 
semantic information unit, representing only a merging zone between the different 
perceptual representation (Burton et al., 1990; 1999).  
The meta-analysis I reported in Chapter 1 of my thesis revealed that the brain network 
was selectively associated with conspecific representation that included several areas in both 
hemispheres. More specifically the network included visual areas (bilateral occipital cortices, 
bilateral fusiform gyri, bilateral posterior STS) possibly corresponding to face recognition 
units (FRUs), auditory areas as the right STS possibly corresponding to voice recognition units 
(VRUs) and areas often found to be associated with emotional processing such as the 
amygdala bilaterally, medial prefrontal cortex, and left inferior frontal gyrus. Interestingly, no 
specific area within the anterior temporal lobes (ATLs) (PINs) has been found to be 
associated with the processing of conspecifics. The lack of an involvement of areas within the 
anterior temporal lobes can be explained in two ways. First, this might be due to the 
deformation of the magnetic field induced by air-filled structures close to ATLs, that, without 
distortion-corrected fMRI protocols, would induce a loss of signal in those areas (Murphy et 
al., 2007). Second, the studies included in the meta-analysis I performed might have used 
tasks and stimuli (e.g., unfamiliar faces) that failed to tap the identity of each individual.  
The finding of unimodal processing areas (i.e., visual, auditory and emotion) associated 
with conspecific knowledge can be interpreted within the context of the model by Bruce and 
Young (1986) on person-specific recognition at least in two different ways. First, this 
functional neuroimaging evidence of emotion-related areas associated with conspecifics 
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processing could be interpreted as recognition unit coded in a different modality (i.e., a 
putative emotion recognition unit), possibly involved in representing the attitude towards 
each individual, and second, it might represent the outcome of the recollection of person-
related knowledge. Hence, the two explanations entangle two different roles of affective 
processing in conspecifics knowledge: According to the former account, affective processing is 
part of the conspecifics conceptual knowledge, while according to the latter it would merely 
be an epiphenomenon of conspecific knowledge recollection. Moreover, the prediction 
stemming from the two accounts is that, for the former, the lesion of emotional processing 
area would lead to the impoverishment of the conceptual knowledge about conspecifics, with 
spared abilities of recognizing people from faces, voices and names, while for the latter it 
would lead to no conceptual deficit of conspecifics knowledge.  
The findings reported on patients with brain tumors and on patients with dementia 
reported respectively in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3,in which I investigated semantic knowledge 
about social groups and other entities (i.e., living things and non-living things), showed that 
the lesion of areas often associated with affective processing led to a selective impairment in 
naming that can be attributed to a degradation of lexical-semantic knowledge about social 
groups (i.e., basic level knowledge about conspecifics). Moreover, in Chapter 4 healthy 
participants performed a lexical decision task with nouns of social groups and exemplars from 
other categories and I observed that participants were slower RT when transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) was applied on one of these areas, i.e. IFGop, than in the control condition 
(i.e., vertex) specifically when the valence of the presented word was negative. This latter 
finding suggests that IFGop is sensitive to the valence of the stimuli. Taken together the 
findings reported in my thesis strongly suggest that affective features are relevant in building 
up a conceptual representation of our conspecifics. They also lead me to reject the hypothesis 
that the activation of emotion-related areas might be an epiphenomenon of the conspecifics 
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perception as suggested by the meta-analysis on neuroimaging studies about conspecifics 
(Chapter 1). 
 The model of person recognition by Bruce and Young (1986) does not directly take 
into account the different levels of specificity of the human stimuli that might contribute 
towards their representation. A human stimulus might be recognized as a specific individual, 
say a person we personally know (unique entities), but also as belonging to a category of 
individuals, that is a social group (supra-ordinate level). Unique entities and supra-ordinate 
human stimuli might differ in several respects: unique entities are usually associated with 
specific semantic knowledge, they are usually associated also with episodic memory, they are 
denoted by a proper name, they might be associated with richer perceptual knowledge than 
supra-ordinate knowledge (which tends to be prototypical) (Ross and Olson, 2012; Wang et 
al., 2016) and the distinction among unique entity elements might be based on more subtle 
features than for supra-ordinate (Gorno Tempini and Price, 2001). The investigation on 
unique entities revealed that, although different categories of entities (e.g., famous persons 
and famous buildings) tend to be associated with distinct sites of activations, all unique 
entities were associated with the function of the temporal poles (Gorno Tempini and Price, 
2001; Ross and Olson, 2012). Coherent with these findings some fMRI experiments showed 
that ATL tend to be activated when the task requires a semantic discrimination between sub-
ordinate entities, but not between supra-ordinate entities (Tyler et al., 2004; Rogers et al., 
2006). Moreover, patients with semantic dementia - a neurodegenerative disease associated 
with the atrophy of ATL - tend to show semantic impairments, which are more severe for 
subordinate knowledge than for supra-ordinate concepts (Patterson et al., 2006; Rogers et al., 
2015). This pattern of findings suggests that along the temporal lobes, there might be a 
gradient of representation, from posterior to anterior, processing, respectively, from general 
to specific concepts (Martin, 2007). However, other studies made the picture more complex. 
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Indeed, ATL was found to be involved also in basic/supra-ordinate level of processing in TMS 
(Pobric et al., 2010) and FMRI (Visser et al., 2011) studies. Moreover, results from 
neuropsychological studies in Chapter 3, and to a smaller extent, in Chapter 2 of my thesis, 
showed that also social group knowledge, which codes information about individuals at a 
supra-ordinate level, was associated with temporal polar damage. Together my findings, 
strongly suggest that ATL might also be involved in the processing of basic-level concepts.  
However, a critical aspect that must be considered when discussing about the 
representation of conspecifics, as well as about other categories of entities, is the functional 
lateralization. Although the meta-analysis (Chapter 1 of this thesis) highlighted a pattern of 
activations associated with conspecifics processing (except for the left IFG) mostly bilaterally, 
patients’ results (reported in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis) highlighted the involvement of a 
left-lateralized network of areas. This pattern of findings might be explained, at least, in two 
ways. The lateralization might be explained by the type of task I used in the experiments, but 
it could also be specific for the representation of this category of knowledge. The relative 
contribution of left and right hemispheres to semantic representation is still a matter of 
debate. Indeed patients with a left-lateralized damage tend to have more impaired production 
abilities compared with their receptive abilities, while patients with right lateralized (or 
predominantly right–lateralized) damage tend to lead to both productive and receptive 
abilities or to very mild impairments (in case of unilateral brain damage) (Lambon Ralph et 
al., 2001; Rice et al., 2015). To explain these findings, two main theories were proposed. First, 
it has been proposed that semantic knowledge might be differently specialized into the two 
hemispheres, with the left ATL involved in representing verbal knowledge and right ATL 
representing non-verbal (e.g., visual, auditory) knowledge (Snowden et al., 2004; 2012). 
Second, another model proposed that semantic knowledge is represented bilaterally, but left-
lateralized semantic storage would have a privileged access to phonological areas, leading 
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left-lateralized semantic deficits to be expressed mainly as lexical impairments. Both the 
neuropsychological studies reported in this thesis (Chapters 2 and 3) demonstrate that 
patients with unilateral and diffuse brain damage showed impaired productive abilities 
(picture naming task) but spared recognition abilities (word-to-picture matching task). 
Moreover patients’ picture naming deficits were mainly associated with lesions of a left-
lateralized network. Hence, according to the model by Snowden (2004, 2012) the social group 
deficits we measured were basically at the lexical level, while according to the model by 
Lambon Ralph et al. (2001) they were at the level of the semantic representation. Although 
this pattern of findings is consistent with both theories on semantic deficits lateralization, 
right lateralized damage to the very same areas in patients with brain tumors did not give rise 
to any semantic deficit (on either production or recognition), thus the model by Snowden et 
al. (2004; 2012) cannot accommodate my results. 
A critical issue about the person recognition model is how the specific processing of 
conspecifics relates to other categories of knowledge. For instance, several studies suggested 
that animate and inanimate entities tend to be processed in discrete neural areas, such as the 
inferior part of the ATL for animate entities, and the inferior parietal lobe (IPL)/posterior 
temporal lobe for inanimate entities (Gainotti, 2000). This pattern of findings was 
consistently found using different methodologies (neuropsychology, fMRI, TMS, 
electrophysiology) and led to propose that these two categories might be processed by 
different neural systems (see also Brambati et al., 2006; Anzellotti et al., 2011; Damasio et al., 
1996; Devlin et al., 2002, Chan et al., 2011) and that, while animate entity processing might 
rely on areas within the ventral visual pathway (inferior temporal cortex) (Kravitz et al., 
2013), inanimate entities might rely on areas within the dorsal visual pathway (IPL) (Kravitz 
et al., 2011). In this context the double dissociations in patients between the knowledge about 
conspecifics at both unique-entity (Hanley et al., 1989; Evans et al., 1995; Miceli et al., 2000; 
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Kay and Hanley, 2002; Lyons et al., 2006; Thompson et al., 2004) and social group (Rumiati et 
al., 2014) level of specificity, and living or non-living entities, suggest that conspecifics are 
processed independently of the exemplars from the other two categories.  
My thesis adds a further piece of information about the way in which conspecifics are 
represented in the brain. In fact I have found evidence that the processing of conspecifics at a 
basic level of specificity is associated with areas typically involved in processing emotions. 
This might be interpreted in different ways depending on the model. For instance, according 
to the domain-specific hypothesis (DSH, Caramazza and Shelton, 1998; Mahon and 
Caramazza, 2011) distinct domains of entities such as animals, plants, artifacts and 
conspecifics, are processed by different neural networks as a result of the evolutionary 
pressure. Thus, the network of areas that I found to be selectively associated with social group 
processing, seems to support the view of a domain-specific representation for conspecifics. 
This interpretation is confirmed by the findings of the meta-analysis reported in Chapter 1 in 
which the same areas (except for insula) were found to be activated in studies which directly 
contrasted social vs. non-social (e.g., animals, places, objects) stimuli. However, the TMS study 
reported in Chapter 4 of the current thesis clarified that one if these areas, the left IFGop 
rather than being involved in the categorical processing of social groups, it might more likely 
be involved in processing emotional stimuli.  
Conversely, other theories highlighted the role of modality-processing areas in 
representing concepts. According to the sensory-functional theory (SFT) (Warrington and 
Shallice, 1984), for instance, our cognitive system processes the distinct conceptual features 
into parallel modality-dependent semantic systems (i.e., sensory, motor/functional). Thus, 
categorical deficits may emerge as a consequence of damage to one of these subsystems, since 
the representation of distinct categories relies on different semantic features.  
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My findings can be better accounted for if, beyond the classical formulation of the 
theory, holding a distinction between sensory (mainly visual) and functional features, we also 
consider the emotional modality dedicated to process the emotional features of conspecifics. 
Indeed, in my study involving patients with neurodegenerative diseases (Chapter 3), the 
deficit in picture naming was associated with the atrophy at the level of bilateral inferior 
temporal cortices for natural categories (the ending point of the ventral visual pathway 
(Kravitz et al., 2013)), with dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex for artificial categories (relevant in 
motor processing (Hetù et al., 2013)), and emotion-related areas for social groups. 
Moreover, Simmons and Barsalou (2003) proposed a hierarchical model, the 
conceptual topography theory (CTT), in which exemplars’ features are represented within 
modality-specific areas that are integrated, through the sequential processing within distinct 
convergence zones (CZs), in order to assemble categorical representations. While analytic and 
holistic CZs are relevant in order to integrate features sharing similar properties, modality 
and cross-modal CZs are relevant for integrating conceptual properties in order to implicitly 
form categorical knowledge. Moreover, they proposed that, within convergence zones, 
neurons representing similar features are located topographically close. This complex model 
has the potential for explaining many different patterns of patients’ deficits, ranging from 
isolated categorical deficits, to multi-categorical deficits (i.e., deficits in the knowledge of more 
than one category, with some categories preserved), to global semantic impairments. 
Categorical semantic deficits might emerge as a consequence of the damage modality and 
cross-modal CZs (respectively on uni-modal and multi-modal concepts), or in the case of 
analytic and holistic CZs lesion, only if the category relies on the damaged property. Thus the 
association between left insula, left anterior cingulate/medial PFC and left IFG lesion with the 
lexical-semantic impairment in patients’ naming social groups is not easy to be explained in 
the light of the CTT. The model easily explains the categorical knowledge deficits reported in 
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the study, but we are not able to say whether these areas are involved in the representation of 
some specific properties of social stimuli (which could be associated with the lesion of 
analytic or holistic CZs) or of their uni-modal categorical knowledge (modality CZs for the 
emotional modality). However, the posterior part of the IFG (pars opercularis) has been 
proposed as a hub connecting affective and motor networks (Jezzini et al., 2015; Gerbella et 
al., 2016; Morecraft et al., 2012), and might be interpreted, in the light of CTT, as a cross-
modal CZ. Moreover, the pattern of findings on natural and artificial stimuli, which coincided 
with the ending points of, respectively the ventral and the dorsal visual pathways, could also 
be interpreted according to the CTT, as modality CZs (or alternatively, cross-modal CZs). 
Hence, the CTT, differently from the SFT, is able to explain why, the deficit in naming a certain 
category of stimuli might be associated with the atrophy within different modality processing 
areas, when is associated with other categories.  
To sum up, the findings of the current thesis, suggest that conceptual knowledge is 
associated with modality-specific processing areas, and specifically that social group 
representation might interact with emotional features. From a theoretical point of view this is 
more easily explainable by the CTT, although is not possible to exclude the role of domain-
specific networks explaining my findings, as suggested by the DSH. However, further research 
is necessary, in order to better understand how we represent our conspecifics and the specific 
role of each emotion-related area associated with social group lexical-semantic knowledge. 
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